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ABSTRACT 
 
REPRESSION, REGIME, MOBILIZATION, WEALTH AND PROTEST: A 
STATISTICAL CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 1990 – 2004 
 
Deren Onursal 
Political Science M.A. Thesis, June 2018 
Thesis Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Özge Kemahlıoğlu 
Keywords: Protest, collective action, repression, regime  
 
 What are the motives behind protests and what factors increases (decreases) the total 
number of protests countries experience?  Previous empirical studies have explored protest’s 
relationship with state repression, regime type, mobilization and wealth.  However, they have 
provided conflicting explanations and theories that are antithetical to one another.  Within the 
rational actor and value-expectancy frameworks, this thesis aims to analyze causes of protests 
across countries from 1990 to 2004.   It concludes that (i) repression and protest have a dynamic 
relationship when regime type is included as a conditioning factor.  The interaction of both 
independent variables in a multivariate regression test evinces that high level of repression has 
a deterring effect on the total number of protests if the regime is autocracy and an increasing 
effect if the regime is a democracy or full democracy.  Moreover, (ii) constraints on freedom 
of media and domestic movement damage mobilization of the dissident and conduce to fewer 
protest activities.  (iii) Contrary to the theories of deprivation, this study infers that nations will 
be more inclined to protest as per capita wealth increases.  Ultimately, (iv) results reveal that 
components of democracy – the absence of repression, media and domestic movement 
freedoms – vary within democracies, indicating that some of our definition and measurements 
of regime types suffer from conceptual stretching and should be revised.   
 
  
 v 
ÖZET 
 
BASKI, REJİM, TOPLUSAM HAREKETE GEÇİŞ, ZENGİNLİK VE PROTESTO: 
ÜLKELER ARASI İSTATİSTİKSEL BİR ARAŞTIRMA 1990 - 2004 
 
Deren Onursal  
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Haziran 2018 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Özge Kemahlıoğlu 
Anahtar Kelimeler: protesto, toplu eylem, baskı, rejim 
 
 Protestoların gerçekleşmesindeki sebepler nelerdir ve hangi unsurlar ülkelerin tecrübe 
ettikleri toplam protesto sayısını arttırır (azaltır)?  Önceki ampirik çalışmalar protestonun, 
devlet baskısı, rejim çeşidi, toplumsal harekete geçiş ve zenginlik ile olan ilişkisini 
incelemiştir.  Ancak, bu çalışmalar çelişkili açıklamalar ve birbirine karşıt teoriler sağlamaktan 
öteye geçememiştir.  Bu tez, rasyonel aktör ve değer-beklenti tasarımlarını uygulayarak, 1990 
ve 2004 arasında ülkeler çapında protestoların sebeplerini çözümlemeyi amaçlamaktadır.  Tez, 
(i) rejim çeşidi koşullandırıldığında, baskı ve protestonun dinamik bir ilişkiye sahip olduğu 
sonucuna varmıştır.  Her iki bağımsız değişkenin çok değişkenli regresyon analizindeki 
etkileşimi, yüksek seviyede baskının toplam protesto sayısı üzerinde, eğer rejim otokrasi ise 
caydırıcı, demokrasi veya tam demokrasi ise arttıran bir etkiye sahip olduğunu açığa 
çıkarmıştır.  Ayrıca, (ii) medya ve yurt içi hareket özgürlüklerinin kısıtlanması, karşıt görüşlü 
kişilerin toplumsal harekete geçişine zarar vermekte ve protesto etkinliklerinin daha az sayıda 
olmasına neden olmaktadır.  (iii) Yoksunluk kuramı teorilerinin aksine, bu araştırma, kişi 
başına düşen zenginliğin arttıkça, ülkelerin protestoya daha çok yatkın olduğu çıkarımını 
yapmaktadır.  En nihayetinde, (iv) sonuçlar, demokrasinin bileşenlerinin – baskının olmayışı, 
medya ve yurt içi hareket özgürlükleri – demokrasiler içindeki çeşitliliğini ortaya çıkarmıştır.  
Bu da göstermektedir ki; rejim türlerinin bazı tanım ve ölçümleri kavramsal genişleme 
yaşamaktadır ve gözden geçirilmelidir.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The notion of democracy has long been regarded as one of the most dangerous and the 
least efficient types of governance until the Late Medieval Ages.  Today, however, most people 
find democracy more convenient and secure in comparison with other types of governing 
systems because, in principle, democracy guarantees fundamental rights to everyone 
indiscriminately.  And the right to protest is one of them.  How do we define political protests 
beyond a simple political right?  When a group of people is not satisfied with a political 
situation or decision, regardless of the state’s regime, they mobilize, gather together and 
attempt to change the policy or the situation that displeases them by making authorities hear 
their voices.  Political protest is an action and an attempt to divert the course governments 
follow. 
The concept of protest is a vital study for political scientists due to two main reasons.  
First, even simple protests, under certain conditions, can turn into social movements, rebellions 
and civil wars.  Seemingly the most innocuous protests may lead to violence.  Protests for the 
unification of Germany and tearing down the Berlin Wall resolved peacefully.  Nonetheless, 
protests for the removal administrations in Libya, Syria, and Yemen conduced to bloody 
conflicts.  Protests not only create political pressure on governments but also have the potential 
to shape the political culture and system of a nation.  We must understand the concept of protest 
initially if political scientists wish to analyze and explain democracy, repressive regimes and 
other forms of political violence such as civil wars and terrorism. 
Second, protest is a daily occurring phenomenon and a political resource that provide 
citizens direct access to policy making (Lipsky, 1968).  In some democracies, where people 
are actively interested in shaping policies, the masses may influence decision makers more than 
electors (Offe, 1985).  Regardless of the country, type of the regime, repressiveness, culture, 
wealth, ethnic problems, people protest.  Some actively demonstrate on streets and clash with 
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the licit forces of the authority; whereas, some passively write petitions to their local 
governments.  In either case, people express their opinions by protesting every day.  Thus, a 
detailed and accurate analysis of the causes of the phenomenon protest will form a basis for 
other studies.   
Therefore, my research question is the following: at a cross-national level, what are the 
causes of protest activities?  The importance of regime type (i.e., full democracy, democracy, 
open anocracy, closed anocracy and authoritarian) in answering this question is self-evident.  
Democracy, as a system, may have a substantial effect on protests; however, how do 
components of democracy individually affect protests?  More specifically, how is protest 
related to repression, media independence and freedom of domestic movement?   
Scholars have attempted to explain the causes of protests with deprivation (Gurr, 1970; 
Gurr, 1993; Aytaç et al., 2017), greed (Regan and Norton, 2005), repression (Khawaja, 1993; 
Francisco, 1995; Pierskalla, 2009), and collective action (Olson, 1971; Hardin, 1982; Lichbach, 
1995).  Also, many cross-national studies and game theoretical approaches have focused on 
alternative drivers of protests: economic conditions (Acemoglu, 2001; Brancati, 2013), regime 
type (Gupta, 1993; Carey, 2006), ethnicity (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Cederman, 2010), 
precipitation (Madestam et al., 2013), and the power of media (Kern, 2011; Kim et al., 2014).  
Ultimately, political scientists produced five major competing theories, namely relative 
deprivation theory (RD), collective action theory (CA), the inverted-U hypothesis, backlash 
theory and value-expectancy (VE).   
All five theories present antithetical explanations on causes of protest.  RD theory 
argues that political repression induces anger because repressive governments deprive citizens 
of their rights and freedom.  Anger causes grievance and grievance leaves citizens no option 
but protest (Gurr, 1970).  According to RD theory, deprivation is not limited to political 
grievances.  In addition to repression, economic inequality and ethnic discrimination are also 
some of the characteristics of a deprived society.  On the contrary, CA theory asserts that 
repression produces a deterring effect on the decision to protest and proposes that the cost of 
protest might be too high under repressive regimes.  Thus, people are less inclined to become 
protesters (Olson, 1971).  The inverted-U hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that people 
protest less in countries with low and high levels of coercion.  Nevertheless, governments that 
coerce citizens moderately experience more protests (DeNardo, 1985; Muller and Weede, 
1990).  Backlash theory maintains that intense coercion stimulates people to protest (Francisco, 
1995).  Finally, value-expectancy model propounds that high level of repression encourages 
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protests if the cost of collective action is low and benefits of the public good is likely to be 
achieved (Muller and Opp, 1986).   
In the light of current major theories, this thesis creates a statistical model to test causes 
of protest and verifies that the effect of repression is adverse for autocracies and positive for 
democratic nations.  It also attempts to contribute to the existing theories by demonstrating that 
specific dimensions of democracy (i.e., freedom of media and domestic movement, the absence 
of repression) might have an impact even within democracies.  First, I argue that government 
repression does not entail grievance and even if it does, repression has a deterring effect 
because protest always has a cost for individual participants.  Second, repression level and 
regime type alone may not be sufficient to explain the frequency of protests because repression 
varies across regime type.  The cost of protest may be different for the dissident in democracies 
than autocracies when governments execute repressive policies.  Hence, this thesis explores 
the effect of both variables’ interaction on protest, asserting that repression in democratic 
nations has a positive impact on protest; whereas the effect is negative should the state is an 
autocracy.  Third, I propound that greater number of protests are organized in nations where 
media is free and domestic movement is unrestricted.  The flow of information through media 
and ability to move domestically make mobilization easier and more efficacious.  Moreover, I 
predict that poor economic conditions do not encourage people to protest.  Contrarily, wealth 
causes more protests.  When the poor do not have any hope to improve their standards of living, 
they may be content with what they already have and may not regard poverty as unjust.  
Nonetheless, the fear for losing wealth may lead the economically advantageous classes to have 
incentives to protest and the rich may have more resources to start and sustain protests.  They 
may also pursue further wealth and its failure may cause grievances.  This argument is central 
to the theory of this thesis because it adduces to support that protests are not motivated by 
grievances.  Ultimately, this thesis controls other factors, i.e., regime durability, the percentage 
of the agricultural land, population and ethnic fractionalization.   
I test the hypotheses of this study with multivariate multiple regression analyses to 
answer the research question, what factors increase or decrease the total number of protesting 
events, and also to check the robustness of findings.  To elucidate the determinants of protest, 
I gathered a dataset using two cross-national panel datasets: World Handbook of Political 
Indicators IV (WHIV) and Mass Mobilization (MM).  Due to reliability issues, which I will 
address in the following chapters, I include Cross National Time Series (CNTS) dataset solely 
with the purpose of demonstrating evidence for the robustness of particular variables.   
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This thesis proceeds as follows: next chapter, I will review studies that have previously 
controlled the effects of political, economic and social factors on protest.  In Chapter 3, I will 
present the theory I apply to this study and my testable hypotheses, most prominently state 
repression, regime type, freedom of domestic movement and media.  Chapter 4 will explicate 
the research design.  Chapter 5 will demonstrate statistical results of the analysis and its 
robustness; and in Chapter 6, I will discuss the interpretation of findings.  The final chapter 
will recapitulate the key findings.   
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 The phenomenon of political conflict has attracted great philosophers and scholars 
since the times of Ancient Greece.  Aristotle (2016) thought that the primary motive of 
revolutions was the urge for obtaining economic and political equality because the common 
people did not have it, and oligarchs were aspired to access greater inequality in their favor.  
During the Early Modern Ages, Karl Marx argued the involvement in collective action to be a 
class related issue.  He thought that individuals got involved in collective action, when “their 
social class is in fully developed contradiction with its antagonists” and revolutions often failed 
because a considerable proportion of workers did not cooperate (Tarrow, 1994, 11).  About a 
century later, Antonio Gramsci (1971) emphasized the importance of organizations for 
mobilization.  Nevertheless, he added that it was necessary to develop workers’ own 
consciousness to engender a revolution and, thus, the organization’s message of revolution 
could be transmitted to the masses.   
 In the Modern Era, we still ask the same questions: How and why do social movements, 
protests, revolutions and civil wars happen?  Yet, our methods to study protest and 
interpretations of findings have evolved throughout the time.  Using formal modeling and 
cross-national studies, researchers have tried to understand causal linkages of protest with 
rational choices of individuals (Lichbach, 1995), grievances (Gurr, 1970), mobilization 
(DeNardo, 1985), population (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), policy changes (Tilly, 1978; Giugni et 
al., 1999), economic factors (Maher and Peterson, 2008), freedom of media (Kim et al., 2014), 
ethnicity (Cederman, et al., 2010; Mele and Siegel, 2017), personal availability (Schussman 
and Soule, 2005) etc.  The most prominent debate in the literature is, however, about the impact 
of economic and political grievances on protest.  Despite the amount of abundant scientific 
research, theoretical disagreements on protest are salient, and there is little consensus among 
scholars. 
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2.1 Repression 
 Mancur Olson’s book The Logic of Collective Action1 (1971) and his model of 
Collective Action (CA) theory that mainly forms the starting point for the disagreement among 
scholars disclose that provision of collective goods through the collaboration of all members 
in a group is destined to fail due to free rider problem.  Olson discusses why domestic political 
conflict (e.g., protest, revolution, rebellion, civil war) does or does not occur and how groups 
can overcome the problem of free riding.  He delineates that unless groups have specific 
characteristics, they cannot eschew the free rider problem for two reasons.  First, defection 
costs an individual member less if everyone else in the group cooperates.  Second, a single 
individual’s contribution makes no “perceptible difference to the group as a whole” as the 
group size enlarges (Olson, 1971, 44).   
 Nonetheless, Olson suggests that organizations with formal structures and unyielding 
leaders may overcome the free rider problem with negative and positive incentives.  Group 
leaders can punish group members who refuse to deliver their share of the cost or leaders can 
convince members that their participation is vital by providing positive “selective incentives” 
for those who show willingness to contribute and act in group’s interest (Olson, 1971, 51).  
Consequently, CA approach asserts that coerced individuals do not rebel against repressive 
governments if they expect repression (Hardin, 1982).  In other words, the core assumption of 
CA theories is that an individual joins collective dissent when “his or her individual benefits 
exceed the individual cost” (Lichbach, 1995).   
 Olson receives three significant criticisms from the skeptics of CA theory (Tarrow, 
1994).  First, the marginal utility does not have to be the main purport of an individual’s 
affiliation with protest.  Although high repression increases risks and costs of violent protests, 
people associate with political action for various reasons, not solely marginal utility.  Second, 
even though the number of participants in a protest can be a crucial factor to measure the 
strength of protest, protests often have no explicit membership and its strength can be inversely 
proportional to the number of participants.  Third, many protests do not have to be backed up 
by organizations, nor have leaders and formal structures.  Some influential social movements 
are not organizations and organizers have little control over the participants.   
                                               
1 First published in 1965. Second edition in 1971. 
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 Ted Gurr (1970) also rejects theories of CA and constructs a competing theory to 
comprehend collective actions.  He explains collective actions through the Relative 
Deprivation (RD) theory, which he defines as “actor’s perception of discrepancy between their 
value expectations and their value capabilities” (p. 24).  Value expectations are the goods 
people believe that they deserve to have, and value capabilities are the goods people are capable 
of obtaining.  Simply, people have the feeling of deprivation when their expectations and 
capabilities do not match.  Deprivation leads people to have grievances, which refer to the 
widely shared dissatisfaction of a group in society about their cultural, political and/or 
economic standing, in comparison to the dominant group (Gurr and Moore, 1997).   
 The discussion of emotions-based explanation such as RD theory is vital for protest 
because state repression is one of the major components of grievances.  From a broad 
perspective, grievances eventually engender frustration among the members of a deprived 
group.  Frustration does not necessarily lead to political violence; however, anger entailed by 
frustration aspires people to aggression.  Within the framework of protest, “repression produces 
anger, and anger encourages collective action among the opponents of the ruling party” (Aytaç 
et al., 2017, 10).  Put differently, when the state confronts aggression of the deprived group, 
repression antagonizes the resistance of those against whom coercion is directed (Gurr, 1970), 
and Hibbs (1973) congruently verifies that the knowledge of the previous repression exerted 
by the elite does not deter protest.  Saxton (2005) argues that groups that suffer from repression 
are prone to rebel if they have cohesive and mobilized characteristics.  The notion that dissident 
activities escalate, as repression increases people’s sense of deprivation is supported by 
Lohmann (1993) who argues that rational, self-interested individuals may have incentives to 
participate in political actions despite costs and free rider problem.   
 Charles Tilly (1978) also acknowledges the importance of grievances for social 
movements, expounds the theories of RD and provides a different perspective.  He maintains 
that grievances do play a role in civil unrests; however, they alone are not sufficient.  Tilly and 
others (DeNardo, 1985; Tarrow, 1994) place mobilization as a key ingredient for internal 
political conflicts.  Tilly argues that repression enhances the cost of collective action and, thus, 
affects mobilization negatively.  He also emphasizes that apparent changes in a government’s 
policy of repression “will rapidly encourage or discourage collective action” (Tilly, 1978, 114).   
 Nevertheless, CA theorists conflict with proponents of RD approach and voice three 
central criticisms.  The initial criticism is regarding the explanation of grievance and the 
conceptual confusion it entails.  Bandura (1973) states that frustration, an essential element for 
grievance, is an ambiguous concept because it subsumes “a diverse set of conditions” (p. 33).  
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The second criticism is that rational action perspective does not gainsay that protestors may 
feel deprived and deprivation can be compatible with RA models.  Howbeit, deprivation is 
more or less irrelevant (Tullock, 1974) and insufficient to explain political violence (Muller 
and Opp, 1986; Muller and Weede,1990).   
 The final criticism is theoretical.  Since the impact of a single individual’s contribution 
on the outcome is negligible, and this particular individual cannot be excluded from public 
goods, CA theorists assert that it is irrational to participate in collective activities (Olson, 1971).  
Thus, people will prefer a free ride, instead of contributing.  Presuming that regime 
responsiveness has a direct impact on the effectiveness of demonstrations (DeNardo, 1985), 
rational actor (RA) models denote that constant repressive policies of a government decrease 
dissent (Lichbach, 1987).  The deterrence effect of coercion “ought to reduce the amount of 
any dissident activities, including violence” on the condition that the government enforces 
harsh negative sanctions (Muller and Weede, 1990, 647).  Similarly, Opp and Roehl (1990) 
espouse the notion that repression is a negative incentive to protest and has a direct effect 
because repression is a cost for individuals who consider civil unrest.   
 Although some empirical evidence adduces to support Lichbach’s proposition (1987) 
and denotes that “repression can be used to shape dissident behavior” (Moore, 1998, 870), RA 
theorists also recognize the fact that we sometimes observe some people in some places who 
do protest and defeat the Rebel’s Dilemma.  This fact generates a paradox, namely the “puzzle 
of CA” (Lichbach, 1995, 12).  Howbeit, RA models remind that rebellion of the grieved rarely 
take place because it is not in every rebel’s interest to rebel.  In a nutshell, RA models point 
out that rational people do not rebel, which Lichbach (1995, 5) demonstrates in a simple 
thought experiment.   
 Figure 1: Jane’s Dilemma 
 
 As shown in the figure, Jane receives the benefit, if she joins everyone else to protest.  
However, her choice of demonstrating with everyone else has a cost – her valuable time at the 
event.  In real life, the cost can vary from loss of time to arrest, injury or even death.  If Jane 
stays at home, while everyone else protests, not only she avoids a loss, but also receives her 
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share of the public good.  In this particular game, rational people will choose the option that 
minimizes costs.  Rational people do not protest but expect others to protest for his or her own 
benefit, considering that participation may result in “possibly disastrous private costs” and 
public benefits are “uncertain” (Lichbach, 1995, 5).  Furthermore, a recent application of RA 
model (Pierskalla, 2009) elucidates that a government should be able to deter protest, as long 
as it has the capability, determination and enough power to repress the dissident.  Nevertheless, 
if a government is feeble, it is more likely that seeking compromise is a better option since 
coercion might not deter the opposition.  In addition, Pierskalla underscores the difference 
between random and strategic protests.  Provided that protests commence randomly due to 
recent and sudden economic shocks (e.g., recent fuel and food riots), repression can be a useful 
political tool for deterrence (p. 135).  On the contrary, if the dissident groups trigger protests 
strategically in a nation with a weak government, repression has the potential to escalate protest 
because governments with inadequate capabilities of repression cannot successfully deter 
protest.   
 The literature provides two more competing theories alternative to the theories of CA 
and RD, namely the Inverted-U hypothesis and backlash theory.  Instead of the linear 
relationship proposed by CA and RD theories (Olson, 1971; Lichbach 1987; Gurr 1970), 
DeNardo’s (1985) RA model predicts a curvilinear relationship between repression and protest.  
The curvilinear suggestion implies that states are more likely to experience an increase in 
protest should they move from low or high repression to midrange repression.  Put differently, 
people in highly coercive states do not or cannot protest due to destructive risks, and people do 
not protest in non-repressive states either because they do not have any deprivation or potential 
benefits are lower than costs.  However, according to the inverted-U approach, states, where 
the coercion level is intermediate, confront protest more frequently.  Tsebelis and Sprague’s 
(1989) analysis with the predator-prey model indicates that protest and coercion diverge and 
oscillate.  In other words, coercion might succeed at suppressing protest at one time, but it 
ferments protest at another.  Scholars have tested DeNardo’s (1985) curvilinear prediction and 
empirically confirmed the inverted-U hypothesis (Muller and Weede, 1990; Opp, 1994).  
Muller and Weede (1990; 1994) state that the deprivation effect declines as state repression 
reaches extreme levels.  They add that the findings of the scarcity of collective action at low 
and high repression can be interpreted with both rational action and deprivation approaches, 
notwithstanding their findings seem to favor a rational action explanation.   
 The relationship between coercion and dissent continues to breed more disagreement 
because the inverted-U approach is challenged by the backlash hypothesis, according to which 
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extreme coercion is followed by surges of protest (Khawaja, 1993).  Regardless of its high 
costs for protesters, severe coercion can have an increasing effect on protest if coercive regimes 
overstep their boundaries.  Francisco’s (1995; 1996; 2004) case studies confirm that unduly 
harsh coercion accelerates protest and the inverted-U hypothesis receives less support than 
backlash.  Francisco (1996) concludes that even though “protest and coercion are interrelated,” 
the lack of repression “does not preclude protest” (p. 1201).   
 Ultimately, value-expectancy model (VE) emphasizes that repression is always a cost 
that hurts the likelihood of protest occurrences and, thus, it “has a direct negative (deterring) 
effect on protest” (Opp and Ruehl, 1990, 521).  However, average citizens may participate in 
protests regardless because it may be “individually rational” to protest (Muller and Opp, 1986; 
484).  Therefore, the effect of repression can be reversed and escalate protests depending on 
the cost of collective action and people’s expectation of success.  It is possible to overcome the 
free-riding problem should individuals think that their participation is efficacious (Finkel et al., 
1989).  VE model, in sum, argues that greater number of protests are likely to take place, on 
the condition that people “become convinced that dissent will achieve the collective good” 
(Rasler, 1996, 134).  When the likelihood of achieving the public good is high, people protest 
in spite of repression because costs remain lower than potential benefits.  And, costs are low, 
especially when the government has an accommodating behavior (Carey, 2006).  Such 
behavior is observed more in democracies than non-democracies, implying that regimes, as a 
system, also have an impact on protest.   
 
 
 
2.2 Regime Type 
 The institutional approach to the puzzle of protest is relatively new in comparison to 
repression.  For a long time, scholars have presumed that repression and authoritarianism have 
an identical impact on domestic political conflict.  Although some studies have shown a strong 
association between democracy and low levels of political repression (Henderson, 1991), the 
presumption that two concepts are equivalent is fallacious.  Under certain conditions, even 
democracies resort to repression when their authority is challenged (Davenport, 2007) and find 
themselves in the dilemma of choosing between coercion and accommodation (Della Porta, 
1995).   
 Democracies are still less likely to repress, especially if they are stable.  Nonetheless, 
how do people react to repression, when democracies implement repressive policies?  The 
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evidence indicates that repressive policies “provoke a higher level of protest demonstrations” 
and for autocracies, “severe sanctions can impose an unbearable cost, resulting in an inverse 
relationship between sanctions and political deaths” (Gupta et al., 1993, 301).  Brancati’s 
(2013) analysis addresses this inverse relationship and supports that the probability of protest 
is less likely to take place in strongly authoritarian states than autocracies, as a result of the use 
of repressive force.  Benson and Kugler (1998) show that democratic nations alleviate violent 
conflict if the institutions are “highly competitive and participatory” (p. 196).   
 Fein’s (1995) “murder in the middle” hypothesis represents a different view.  She 
asserts that gross violations of human rights occur in nations, in which democracies are not 
“fully institutionalized” (p. 170).  Pierskalla (2009) applies this framework to the concept of 
protest, and his extensive strategic game confirms that murder does happen in the middle.  In 
other words, semi-democracies and transitioning regimes face more protests than full 
democracies or authoritarian regimes because the ‘middle’ regimes do not have enough power 
to debar dissident groups from organizing and engaging in demonstrations (Hegre et al., 2001).   
 
 
 
2.3 Economic Conditions 
 Identical to repression-protest nexus, the opinion on whether poor economic conditions 
incite people to protest diverges among political scientists.  The first divergence is based on 
the measure of poor economic conditions.  Unemployment, GDP/capita, GNP/capita, 
discrimination, landlessness, poverty and inequality are the most common ones when scholars 
seek for a causal relationship between economy and protest (Hibbs, 1973; Muller and Seligson, 
1987; Gurr, 1994; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Schussman and Soule, 2005; Maher and Peterson, 
2008; Cederman, et al., 2010).  The second is about how economic conditions of individuals 
and the state affect protests.  Scholars from Aristotle and de Tocqueville through Lipset and 
Dahl have thought poor economic conditions to be a plausible idea as a major cause of political 
conflict.  It has been traditionally theorized that countries with unequal distribution of income 
and wealth are prone to conflict (Russett, 1964; Huntington, 1968;).  Nevertheless, there are a 
great number of scholars who offer alternative views as well (Tilly, 1978; Skocpol, 1979; 
Lichbach, 1989).   
 RD models depict that government repression is not the only cause for relative 
deprivation.  Economic conditions are also another form of deprivation, which may generate 
grievance. Gurr (1970) assumes that material values are the greatest and most common 
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concerns of people.  Our hopes and fears are primarily due to the personal economy; therefore, 
people’s economic concerns affect the intensity of relative deprivation even more than security.  
Gurr (1993) contends that political and economic differentials, poverty and discrimination 
“have a major impact on the grievances” and economic disadvantages are consistently 
correlated “with demands for greater political rights” (p. 188).  Regions and countries with 
systemic poverty are prone to more frequent and intense conflicts because “systemic poverty 
means limited state capacity,” which exacerbates power and material related problems between 
the dissident and state (Gurr, 1994, 359).  Panning (1983) discusses the effects of economic 
conditions on relative deprivation and agrees on the implications of RD concerning inequality’s 
effect on political instability.  However, he points out a curvilinear relationship, arguing that 
that “relative deprivation is greatest at intermediate levels of inequality and lowest when 
inequality is either very high or very low” (p. 77). 
 On the other hand, RA theorists suggest that economic inequality does not turn into 
dissent because rational actors care about the wages they earn “relative to what they can do, 
not relative to what others receive” (Lichbach, 1989, 460).  Furthermore, Lichbach’s (1990) 
game theoretical model of IC nexus explicitly dismisses the direct effect of inequality on 
conflict and “show that people neither rebel against inequality in wealth nor inequality in 
income” even if rational actors are relatively deprived (p. 1052).  In fact, rational actors are 
more concerned with maximizing “their opponent’s pain rather than their own pleasure” (ibid.).  
The reason RD models find a significant relationship between inequality and conflict is that 
“changes in economic and political conditions affect both inequality and strategic 
considerations, but only strategizing affects conflict” (ibid.).   
 On the contrary, further empirical studies provide evidence in support of RD theory.  
Midlarsky (1988) finds that economic inequality and political violence are strongly associated 
in Latin America.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) note that per capita income is one of the conditions 
that favors the probability of the outbreak of a civil war.  Maher and Peterson (2008) observe 
mixed results with regard to the impact of weak economic conditions on dissent.  They 
postulate that when citizens experience progress in their economic conditions, they may be less 
willing to dissent, and states may prefer to use nonviolent means to preclude the disruption of 
the status quo.  Moreover, Cederman et al. (2010) also report that GDP per capita exhibits a 
negative effect on ethnonationalist conflict.  A recent study (Brancati, 2013) demonstrates that 
overall economic performance, not solely income per capita, is essential for pro-democracy 
protests.  If the economy performs poorly on inflation, employment, growth, and GDP per 
capita, an increase of pro-democracy protests is more likely.   
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  Some scholars espouse the idea that wealth and collective action are indeed related, 
but the relation is inverse.  Brady et al. (1995) assert that high political activity requires time, 
money and civic skills because citizens with wealth have more resources to sustain and remain 
in political activity.  Schussman and Soule (2005) partially agrees with a resource-based 
approach to political participation and conditionally maintain that higher income increases the 
possibility of protesting.  The effect of income on the probability of protesting loses its 
significance when authors introduce measures of political engagement and structural 
availability into the analysis.  They also denote that unemployment does not affect protest.  
Regan and Norton (2005) acknowledge that the incentive to free ride for rational actors is 
always a problem; however, grievance is “the backbone of protest and rebellious movements” 
(p. 322).  Contrary to their expectations, their analysis evinces that GDP per capita positively 
affects the onset of rebellion.  Su (2015) argues that high level of economic development 
provides more resources for protest and GDP per capita is one of the indicators for economic 
development, along with inflation and GDP growth.  Although inflation and GDP growth are 
insignificant, he finds a positive relationship between GDP per capita and anti-government 
protests.  Finally, Kim (2016) propounds that income, which she measures with GDP per 
capita, mobilizes masses and confirms that it increases protest activity.   
 
 
 
2.4 Further Explanations 
 So far, I have shown that conventional discussion on protest and other internal political 
conflict types has produced five major theories – relative deprivation, collective action, 
inverted-U, backlash, value-expectancy.  These theories are mainly based on two indicators, 
namely repression and inequality.  Nevertheless, explanations of the protest puzzle are not 
circumscribed with coercion, economic conditions, political discrimination and demographic 
characteristics.  Political scientists attempt to expound protest with ethnic fractionalization, 
regime duration, population and civil liberties such as freedom of media and movement.   
 Freedom of movement is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  Signatory states recognize “the right to freedom of movement 
and residence within the borders of each state” and “to leave any country, including his own, 
and to return to his country” 2 as a human right (UN General Assembly, 1948).  Yet, states still 
impose sanctions on their citizens and limit their right to move within and without their 
                                               
2 Universal declaration of human rights (217[III]A). Paris 
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countries.  Moller and Skaaning (2013) demonstrate that states coerce the freedom of 
movement more than the freedom of religion among the civil liberties.  This argument can be 
explained with domestic and international effects of freedom of movement.  When foreign 
movement has no or little restrictions, states are exposed to an international environment that 
can often be volatile and some regimes might regard such environment as a threat and a 
destabilizing factor.  Hence, some authoritarian states do not allow dissidents to leave and, 
instead, eliminate them (Gregory et al.,2006).  Other regimes, on the other hand, encourage 
dissidents to leave the country anticipating that they are potential troublemakers (Pfaff, 2006).  
Besides foreign movement, states limit freedom of domestic movement because mobilization 
for collective action is “easier when there are fewer constraints on internal mobility” (Barry et 
al.,2014, 582).  Violation of domestic movement freedom damages the opportunity to mobilize 
and, in return, make protest activities harder to coordinate and organize.  Thus, freedom of 
domestic movement constitutes a cardinal mechanism for the studies of protest.  Nonetheless, 
the literature about the impact of freedom of domestic movement on protest is strikingly scarce.   
 Unlike domestic movement, scholarly opinions on freedom of media and its 
relationship with protest are more abundant.  Media freedom has long been associated with 
democracy and suggested that media freedom assists in improving government treatment of 
citizens and free press is necessary to expose the violation of rights and abuses (Amnesty 
International, 2006).  Therefore, regimes are inclined to “keep people poorly informed” 
(Moore, 1995, 447).  Whitten-Woodring (2009) confirms that free press can act as a watchdog 
over government behavior, but this is “the case only in highly democratized countries” (p. 616).  
Media’s role as a watchdog does not fruit better and fair treatment of citizens in all nations.  
Game-theory models support previous empirical findings and exhibit that both protest and 
media watchdogging events rarely occur unless a country scores a high level of democracy 
(Kim et al., 2014).   
 Tarrow (1994) states that media serves social movements as an external resource in 
three stages.  First, the media facilitate the diffusion of consensus.  Second, it helps movements 
to gain the initial attention.  Finally, it sustains movements by galvanizing the feelings of 
protesters.  Also, the media are, Tarrow highlights, far from being disinterested 
notwithstanding.  Social movements can benefit from media coverage under specific 
conditions, one of which is democratic ruling of a nation.  However, democratic regime is not 
enough for media to publish and air news about social movements and help them gain 
popularity.  It is the capitalist societies, in which the media may avail social movements in 
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diffusing consensus, gaining attention and galvanizing participants since the media stay in 
business and profit “only if they report on what will interest readers” (p. 128).   
 Kern (2011) provides empirical results for some of Tarrow’s theoretical arguments.  He 
finds no evidence that news coverage of West German television was able to facilitate the 
diffusion of protest in East Germany during the 1989 revolution.  Another study, on the other 
hand, shows that protests in countries with high levels of media freedom have an exasperating 
impact on coups because “the publicity of the protest causes elites to sharpen their beliefs about 
what other elites will do” (Casper and Tyson, 2014, 562).  Therefore, it lowers the uncertainty 
of elite’s decision  
 The epidemic use of social media in the last decade and global events like Arab Spring 
gave students of protest the idea that Tarrow’s three stages of the conventional media as an 
external resource could also be applied to the social media.  Shelley Boulianne (2015) asserts 
that the use of social media and participation in civic and political life have a positive 
relationship.  Howbeit, she notes that her survey-based study of social media does not explain 
whether the relationship is causal or transformative.  Brancati (2013) refuses to undermine the 
potency of social media because social media indeed make it easier and faster for protesters to 
communicate.  Yet, her results indicate that the use of internet and cell phones do not affect the 
likelihood of pro-democracy movements occurrence, although such new technological 
developments might influence the size and duration of protests.   
  In addition to freedom of media and domestic movement, scholars have also explored 
the relationship between domestic political conflict and ethnicity.  Ethnic differences, directly 
or indirectly, have affected some of the most remarkable political conflicts in our history.  
Therefore, it would be anomalous to omit the ethnicity.  Scholars have traditionally argued that 
nations, in which sharp ethnic cleavages exist, are exposed to political violence and these 
cleavages intensify the conflict (Tarrow, 1994; Gurr, 1994).  Gurr (1993; 1994) tenaciously 
maintains that states are prone to ethnic conflicts, especially if they are in the process of 
democratization.  A recent game theoretical work (Mele et al.; 2017) supports the conventional 
assumptions and concludes that oppressed minority groups may engage in anti-state operations 
even under strong repression.   
 Collier et al. (2001) provide empirical evidence that is antithetical to the theories that 
propound a positive association with ethnic fragmentation.  Authors evince that ethnic diversity 
reduces the risk of civil war and “makes societies safer, while dominance increases the risk of 
conflict” (p. 127).  On the other hand, some scholars present no statistical significance between 
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ethnic fragmentation and conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Regan and Norton, 2005; Maher 
and Peterson, 2008).   
 Lastly, scholars have also attempted to explain protest activity with regime duration, 
population and agriculture.  Regime duration implies the “temporal length” of a nation’s 
political institutions (Grzymala-Busse, 2011, 1269) and although regime age and durability are 
not exactly the same thing, scholars have posited that they have a positive relationship 
(Huntington, 1968; Svolik, 2012).  Gurr (1994) maintains that interrupted democratic years is 
one of the conditions for the emergence and persistence of ethnopolitical conflicts.  Although 
Saxton’s (2005) replication of Gurr fails to confirm that regime duration is among the 
determinants of rebellion, the general view suggests that “newer regimes are more likely to 
suffer” (Levitsky and Way, 2012, 873).  Population is another commonly used explanation for 
types of protest.  Gurr and Moore (1997) demonstrate that large population causes grievances 
and, thus, indirectly influence rebellion.  Moreover, Su (2015) finds that countries with large 
population experience anti-government protests more often.  However, when looked from a 
rationalistic perspective, group size actually offers individual actors incentives to free ride as 
it enlarges (Olson, 1971).   
 Despite Marx’s predictions, history has shown us that some of the greatest revolutions 
broke out in agrarian societies.  Skocpol (1979) argues that prerevolutionary France, Russia 
and China were predominantly agrarian societies and agriculture was economically more 
important than commerce and industry.  Peasant exploitation by the upper class in these 
agrarian states caused peasants to rebel and the spread of peasant rebellions produced 
revolution.  Nonetheless, this historical comparative method has received numerous criticisms.  
Although Skocpol’s historical approach is notably informative about the past peasant 
revolutions, today, many scholars lean towards the notion that protests are more likely to occur 
in urban areas, not rural (Hibbs, 1973; Muller and Seligson, 1987; Maher and Peterson, 2008).  
Lichbach (1994), from a rationalist perspective, claims that benefits of the collective action are 
not enough to start a peasant rebellion.  Therefore, peasants need selective incentives that will 
motivate them to rebel.  Nevertheless, even if selective incentive solution to the free rider 
problem manages to start a peasant rebellion, it alone is not enough to sustain it.  Hence, 
selective incentives tied to ideological appeals are necessary for an efficacious peasant 
rebellion because participants with stronger ideological conviction will be eager to pay more 
costs (North, 1981).   
 In conclusion, this chapter introduced repression, regime type, economic conditions as 
the main explanations of internal political conflicts (protests, civil wars, rebellions and 
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revolutions) in the literature.  Although scholars primarily focus on these three explanations, 
they have also inquired into how freedom of domestic movement, freedom of media, regime 
duration, population and agriculture affect protests.  Academic disagreements on how each 
explanation affects protest is notably abundant.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 Students of conflict have attempted to explain why protests occur more often in some 
countries than others, focusing on state repression and regime type.  Nevertheless, results are 
contradictory.  Analyses of CA and RD theories denote incongruous empirical evidence for the 
impact of wealth on protest.  Although some studies on media freedom do exist, social scientists 
seem to have failed to pay adequate attention to the relationship between protest and freedom 
of domestic movement, which is the essence of mobilization.  This chapter concisely examines 
the value-expectancy model with respect to the concept of protest; presents hypotheses mostly 
based on the teachings of the RA research program and extend the rational approach that 
conventionally uses formal game theoretical models with empirical evidence at the cross-
national level.   
 
 
 
3.1 Theory 
 As explained in Chapter 2, CA theorists argue that people are deterred from protesting 
because protest, like all types of collective action, bears a cost that actors must overcome.  
Although theories of CA do not gainsay that people might have grievances, they assert that 
grievance is not a sufficient condition to partake in protest.  Albeit motivated with grievances, 
it is not in every disaffected citizens’ interest to protest due to the costs.  Thus, grievances 
induced by state repression, non-democratic regime type, barriers on mobilization and poor 
economic conditions should not stimulate protest but preclude it.  Causes of grievances are 
usually factors that raise costs of CA.  As the level of repression increases, the cost of CA also 
increases and outweighs the benefits of public good, which then leads actors to prefer free-ride, 
instead of contributing.  Hence, people demur at protesting (Olson, 1971; Hardin, 1982; 
Lichbach, 1995) 
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 However, for some countries, cost of CA does not exceed the expected benefits, in spite 
of high level of repression.  When costs remain lower than benefits, people do protest even 
under growing repression (Muller and Opp, 1986; Finkel et al., 1989; Opp and Roehl, 1990; 
Rasler, 1996; Carey, 2006).  Conditional on cost-benefit balance, repression has both positive 
and negative effects on protest, and we call this value-expectancy model.  When dissidents 
believe that public good is achievable, protest becomes a rational action and the opposition acts 
collectively.  In sum, based on the value-expectancy model, this thesis argues that countries, in 
which repression has a positive effect on protest, are the ones with democratic regimes because 
democratic governments are cooperative, compromising and concessive.   
 Repression and regime type are interrelated with each other.  Previous studies show 
that democracies perform low levels of repression (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004) and some 
scholars consider democracy as “a proxy for repressive behavior” (Gurr and Moore, 1997, 
1083).  Since they are interrelated, their combined effect on protest is crucial for studies of 
domestic conflict.  Nonetheless, repression and regime type are two different concepts and, 
thus, it is imperative to account for the individual effects of both concepts on protest.  Since 
high levels of coercion in democracies are relatively rare phenomena, one may assert that 
democracy reduces the cost of collective action and, consequently, we observe more protests 
in democratic nations.  Nevertheless, the system of a government alone, irrespective of 
repression, also has an impact on protest.  Democracy, as a system, should have a decreasing 
effect on protest due to the fact that democracies incentivize rulers and the ruled to cooperate.  
Citizens of democratic nations can bring conflicts with the government to an end without a 
mass action.  In autocracies, however, conflicts may escalate and never end.   
 Regardless of regime type and repression, participation in political activities requires 
an entry cost.  Citizens must have adequate resources to act collectively (Lee, 2011).  Beyond 
this argument, some might that people who are economically disadvantageous and cannot 
afford collective action tend to stay at home, instead of protesting.  Putatively, wealth will 
reduce the entry cost; therefore, economy related grievances will not ferment collective action.  
The rationalistic approach follows a similar path for any situation that may generate grievances, 
i.e., population, ethnic fractionalization, media censorship and freedom to move within a 
country.  For instance, CA theories posit an adverse effect of high ethnic fractionalization on 
protest (Mele and Siegel, 2017) since ethnicity is an obstacle for reaching consensus among 
actors from different ethnic identities to act collectively.  The same thought process can be 
applied to the effect of media and domestic movement freedom.  Citizens do not venture on a 
costly activity because state silences the media and controls the movement within the country.  
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They choose not to protest, as mobilization is virtually impractical as a result of coercive 
government policies.   
 Based on the discussion about rational choice and grievance-related theories, I argue 
that some grievances may conduce deprived people to protest, but the essential condition to 
protest is based on whether the cost of collective action is low.  It is often democracies where 
costs are lower, and benefits of public good are achievable.  Therefore, people in democracies 
act collectively, when repressed.  In autocracies, on the other hand, people rationally decide to 
avoid high costs by staying at home when coerced.  Therefore, we can conclude that repression 
works in autocracies.  Guided by this rationalistic stand, I formulate that censorship on media 
and restrictions on domestic movement will make mobilization more difficult and costlier for 
potential protesters.  Once freedom for the media and domestic movement is secured, protest 
aggravates on account of quick and efficient mobilization.  Nonetheless, we still see acts of 
political terror practiced by governments on citizens, restrictions on media freedom and 
constraints of domestic movement in democracies.  Why do we observe repression and limits 
on freedom of media and domestic movement even in democratic states?  The notion that these 
three policies differentiate between different types of regimes is plausible, but differentiation 
within the same regime type is arresting.  Since we expect that democracies do not repress and 
allow freedom of media and domestic movement and these practices should be attributes of 
democracy, then, the question evolves into whether we have an accurate definition of 
democracy.   
 In sum, the theory presented in this thesis construes that low level of repression is 
conducive to protests; however, the repressive behavior of a government has mixed effects on 
protest once regime type is employed into the equation as a conditional factor.  Similarly, civil 
liberties also account for civil unrest considering that they ease mobilization and reduce the 
costs of collective action.  Deprivation and grievances are determining factors but limited to a 
certain extent.  The theory overall favors rational choice approach.   
 
 
 
3.2 Hypotheses 
 As briefly introduced, I assert that repression intimidates citizens due to costly 
consequences of participation, including jail time, injury, and death.  Because repression is a 
tool, which governments use to display their strength, “people who come to dislike their 
government are apt to hide their desire for change” and hesitate becoming protesters (Kuran, 
 21 
1989, 41).  In other words, repression should work for individuals who wish to eschew harmful 
outcomes.  This reasoning leads us to the first hypothesis: 
H1a: The higher level of political violence a state exercises on its citizens, the fewer numbers 
of protests occur. 
 Regime type designates the institutional settings of a country and shapes the interaction 
between the government and citizens.  Hence, the ruling system is a determinant of how citizens 
react to the government within a regime.  Despite the solidity of the idea that democracies tend 
to be less coercive, democracy does not necessarily measure repression and is not tantamount 
to low repression.  Nevertheless, democratic institutions “are designed to facilitate compromise 
and cooperation”; whereas, autocracies usually lack “institutionalized channels that 
accommodate popular discontent and opposition” (Carey, 2006, 4).  Due to the absence of the 
norms that favor dialogue and institutions that placate refractory citizens, autocracies face more 
demonstrations.  Thus, the next hypothesis is: 
H1b: The higher level of democracy a country achieves, the fewer number of protests it 
experiences.  And, conversely, greater number of protests are organized if the regime system 
is autocratic. 
 In a nutshell, the first hypothesis predicts that repression will deter demonstrations and 
the latter suggests that autocracies will be more vulnerable to protests.  These hypotheses may 
seem to be contradictory since democracies are usually less repressive than others.  However, 
they are, in fact, complementary with each other.  Regime type determines whether the 
interaction between the state and citizens is based on compromise or refusal of cooperation.  
Yet, how regime type influences collective action is by no means straightforward because 
repressive policies can also be found in democracies.  I expect that an interacted effect of 
repression and regime type provides a better explanation and, therefore, postulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H1c: High level of political violence a state exercises on its citizens will have a positive 
effect on the number of protests, as the regime gets more democratic but a negative effect as 
the regime behaves more autocratic. 
 The success of organizing collective action mainly depends on actors’ ability to 
mobilize other individuals.  Provided that government confines mobilization effectively, a 
surrender or clandestineness (Francisco, 2000) are the only two viable options for the dissenter.  
Hence, taking coercive measures is vital for governments that desire to deter actors from 
protesting and protect the status quo.  One of the most vigorous ways to limit mobilization is 
to constrain the freedom of movement within the country.  If the government does not allow 
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citizens to move freely within a country and impose harsh sanctions, the number of dissenters 
or the strength of action will substantially diminish.  An opposition without the ability to 
change location will pose less threat for the ruler.   
H2a: Freedom of domestic movement is positively associated with the frequency of protests. 
 Connately, media freedom is also essential for mobilization.  Media support and power 
provide the initial attention protests desperately need to recruit and to sustain protest (Tarrow, 
1994).  The opposition will have a hard time to mobilize and organize should government keeps 
people ill-informed by disallowing the media to report the truth.  Strictly state-controlled media 
has two major outcomes for the disaffected individuals.  First, people will not know that the 
government does not perform well and fulfill its responsibilities.  Second, without the media 
that can “facilitate coordination”, people may not even be aware of planned protesting events 
(Casper and Tyson, 2014, 549).  Hence, I expect that constraints of fundamental civil liberties, 
particularly freedom of media and domestic movement, will inversely influence the frequency 
of protests because mobilization will be limited. 
H2b: The freer media operate in a country, the more protests it experiences. 
 As discussed in H1b and H1c, democracy affects protest as a system, and I hypothesize 
that repression, media, and movement freedom also have a significant influence independently 
of regime types.  Howbeit, we usually characterize repression, media and movement freedoms 
as some of the core attributes of democracy.  Therefore, we do not anticipate observing 
coercion or restrictions on aforementioned freedoms in democratic nations.  Democracy, after 
all, should be the antonym of restrictions on any freedom and should not exclusively refer to 
political competition.  Nonetheless, I expect to see repression, and limitation on freedom of 
movement and media even within democracies.  The vital implication of the hypotheses stated 
so far is that these three fundamental dimensions, not only vary between different regime types, 
but also within regimes – more importantly, democracies.  The reason behind the variation is 
our inadequate measures and problematic definition of democracy.  Thus, H1 and H2 each 
require careful analysis.   
 Finally, next major hypothesis is germane to economic conditions.  Do we feel grieved 
when our neighbors have more resources to live while we have only so little?  Do we act 
collectively, when we are deprived of economic equality?  Gurr (1970; 1993; 1994) have 
repeatedly argued the answer to be yes.  On the contrary, I maintain that wealth influences the 
frequency of protesting events positively for three reasons.  First, economic inequality and 
poverty are two ubiquitous phenomena for all nations.  Some do a better job at closing the gap 
than others.  Inequality might not turn into dissidence even when absolute poverty is present 
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(Lichbach, 1989).  Second, wealth provides resources and incentives to sustain protest.  No 
matter how grieved individuals are, protests are not viable without economic resources.  The 
poor economy may cause individuals to have grievances; however, it is not sufficient to start a 
social movement.  Third, as people get wealthier, they are apt to be politically risk-averse 
because affluent people have more to lose than the destitute (Przeworski et al., 2000).  The fear 
of losing material goods induces conflict.  Therefore, the final hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: The higher per capita GDP a country achieves, the more exposed it is to protest 
activities. 
 Ultimately, my analysis also controls for regime duration, population, ethnic 
fractionalization, and percentage of the agricultural land area.  In brief, I predict that regimes 
that last a long time without any breakdown are eventually occupied with fewer protests 
because people get accustomed to the environment they live and are born into over the years.  
Young regimes, on the other hand, are more likely to suffer from the public disorder.  I 
anticipate that countries with a large population have protests more often.  Large population 
requires more effort, time and resources to surveil the activities of the opposition (Gurr and 
Moore, 1997).  I also argue that ethnic fractionalization is negatively associated with protests.  
Ethnically diverse societies are not in constant conflict, albeit the popular belief.  The notion 
that it is more difficult to cooperate in ethnically diverse nations is spurious because ethnic 
dominance eliminates the need to compromise and cooperate (Collier et al., 2001).   
 Finally, I consider agricultural factors by controlling for the effects of the percentage 
of agricultural land area to the total area.  Peasants may have reasons to challenge the authority 
that continually attempts to exploit them (Skocpol, 1979).  Therefore, a high agricultural land 
percentage is expected to indicate potential conflict because agricultural land provides 
insurgents with “rural base areas” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, 79), which host rebels and hide 
them from government forces.  Moreover, agricultural goods may play a role in financing to 
start and sustain a protest (ibid.).  Hence, a nation with large agricultural lands should 
experience protest more often (Bernstein and Lü, 2003, 6; Li and O’Brien, 2008, 22). 
 Indeed, this variable has some limitations.  For instance, it does not necessarily measure 
some of the agriculture related variables, such as land inequality (Panning, 1983; Midlarsky, 
1988) and rural population (Madestam et al., 2013).  Howbeit, neither land inequality nor rural 
population provide a more fulfilling alternative than agricultural land percentage.  First of all, 
“land is everywhere distributed unequally” including the most egalitarian states (Russett, 1964, 
449).  Second, equal distribution of agricultural land’s effect on protest can be a fallacy since 
the distributed land may “invariably include the highest, driest, and least fertile tracks” 
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(Zamosc, 1994, 43).  If that was the case, peasants would still be discontent because it is the 
efficacy of land distribution that matters to the peasants.  Rural population assumedly 
demonstrates the group size for peasants and their potential strength for collective action.  It 
could also be supplementary to the protest and agricultural land relationship.  Nevertheless, 
nations’ rural population and their overall population have high correlation since population 
variable is the sum of both rural and urban populations.   
 In conclusion, this thesis bases its theory on rational choice and shapes the framework 
with value-expectancy model.  It formulates protest’s relationship with state behavior, 
mobilization and economic conditions under five hypotheses.  Next chapter introduces the 
design, data and models.  The following chapter will present the statistical findings.   
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA AND MODEL 
 
 
 The central question of this thesis is what causes protest and it aims to test specific 
factors that might be increasing (decreasing) the total number of protests that are held around 
the globe for each year from 1990 to 2004.  The study has a greater purpose than solely 
analyzing the five competing theories of protest and showing that they, in fact, complement 
each other in various ways.  The first purpose is to show how repression affects protest 
conditional on regime type.  Second, it is to contribute to previous theories by demonstrating 
that some civil and political liberties that indicate causal relationships with protest show 
variances within democracies, although one would innately presume the utter absence of 
constraints on liberties under democratic regimes.  Thus, I constructed a design, collected 
appropriate data and analyzed them.   
 
 
 
4.1 Design 
 I assembled a panel dataset gathered from a variety of sources on 158 countries for the 
years 1990 through 2004 to test hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3.  I need a systematic analysis 
to control for multiple causal factors; therefore, I have decided to conduct a multiple regression 
analysis.  Since one of the hypotheses posits a conditional theory, I introduce an interaction 
variable for the regression model.  This kind of large-N quantitative design is in line with 
previous arguments.  The total amount of observations is 2,322 and unit of analysis is country 
per year.  The selection of countries and time frame are both critical for two reasons.  First, I 
demur from the idea that the focus of the research should be specific countries or continents 
when the data is available for the majority of the world.  Large samples are always better at 
avoiding multicollinearity and selection bias (King et al., 1994).  Second, 158 countries from 
1990 to 2004 are common observations of three different datasets, namely World Handbook 
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of Political Indicators IV (WHIV), Mass Mobilization (MM) and Cross-National Time Series 
(CNTS).  The common observations will later be used to demonstrate the robustness of 
findings. 
 
 
 
4.2 Data Collection and Variables 
 The dependent variable is the total number of protest events in 158 nations from 1990 
through 2004.  I do not separate the dependent variable as violent and non-violent because 
protests consist of confrontational actions and “violence ordinarily grows out of collective 
actions that are not intrinsically violent” (Tilly, 1997, 79).  Therefore, violent and non-violent 
activities are parts of “one continuum” (Carey, 2006, 2).  Several quantitative datasets are 
publicly available for this kind of study; however, WHIV, MM, and CNTS are some of most 
regularly used datasets to test theories of protest (Muller and Weede, 1990; Maher and 
Peterson, 2008; Barry et al., 2014; Kim, 2016).  The annual version of WHIV (Jenkins et al., 
2012) provides comprehensive information on political conflict with more than 11,000 
observations from 1990 to 2004.  Some actions of political conflict on WHIV include protest 
obstruction, procession, rally support, censorship, political arrest, assassination, suicide 
bombing, riot, etc.  WHIV’s definition of protest is considerably broader than MM and CNTS; 
therefore, I generate a new dependent variable for the total number of protests that share 
common components with datasets mentioned above.  These components include strikes and 
boycotts, riots and demonstrations.  Furthermore, WHIV codes protestors separately under 
three types of actors, i.e., civilians, state and unknown.  By doing so, the database underlines 
that not all protesters are civilians.  Military officers, for instance, can organize a rally to 
support the incumbent government.  Nevertheless, I focus on the civilian actors because MM 
and CNTS disregard state actors as protesters. 
 Mass Mobilization (Clark and Regan, 2015) cover the globe, observing 162 countries 
from 1990 to 2014.  The time range makes MM the most recent dataset.  Authors define protest 
as “a gathering of 50 or more people to make a demand of the government” and generate the 
dataset based on searching four keywords in Lexis-Nexis, which are protest, demonstrations, 
riot and mass mobilization (MM, 2015).  They also code protests concerned with industrial 
enterprise such as labor rights, on the condition that people demand improved labor conditions, 
wages and safety by demonstrating on the streets.  Since the unit of analysis of the dataset from 
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protest-country-year, I aggregated the protest variable and converted the unit of analysis to 
country-year.   
 Cross-National Time Series (Banks and Kenneth, 2010) offers over 200 variables for 
more than 200 countries since 1815.  It provides eight types of domestic conflict mostly derived 
from The New York Times.  Nonetheless, only the variables general strikes, riots and anti-
government demonstrations suffice the common definition of protest.  Only the events that 
involve 100 or more citizens are regarded as riots and anti-government demonstrations and 
1000 or more workers as general strikes.  The unit of analysis on CNTS was country-year; 
therefore, I created a new variable for protest by summing up general strikes, riots and anti-
government demonstration for each country in a given year. 
 As for the explanatory and control variables, each one of them requires an explicit 
definition.  Repression level, regime type, the interaction of repression and regime type, 
freedom of media, freedom of domestic movement and wealth are the independent variables I 
predict to have a strong causal relationship with the dependent variable, the total number of 
protests.  I also control for regime duration, population, ethnic fractionalization, and percentage 
of the agricultural land area.   
 Political Terror Scale (PTS) is a compiled index that comes from the annual country 
reports of Amnesty International, U.S. Statement Department, and Human Rights Watch.  It 
measures violations of basic human rights and physical integrity by the state in a particular 
year and country.  Hence, the term political terror does not construe terrorism.  I use PTS to 
measure states’ repression levels and argue that protests are more viable in less repressive 
nations.  The scale of political terror ranges from 1 to 5.  A country assigned with a score of 5 
indicates that citizens experience the highest level of political terror and a score of 1 indicates 
the lowest.  Since a great number of observations are missing for Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch, the repression variable mainly relies on scores from US State 
Department.  Authors warn users about computing the average scores of three reports due to 
each report’s different methodology for generating the dataset (Gibney et al., 2017).  Therefore, 
Amnesty International substituted US State Department if US State Department scores were 
missing. 
 A country’s political system (regime type) should affect the number of protests that 
organized per year.  I measure regime type using Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2016) to assert that 
people challenge authority by protesting less in democratic nations than they do in autocracies 
because democratic institutions, unlike their counterparts, promote compromise and 
cooperation.  Despite heavy criticisms on both, Freedom House’s (FH) measure of democracy 
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is as popular as Polity among scholars.  Howbeit, FH is substantially biased and inconsistent 
with its coding criteria (Steiner, 2016).  Scholars have expressed concerns that democracy 
scores in FH are biased towards US, US allies and US friendly states (Hartman and Hsiao, 
1988; Mainwaring et al., 2001).  In addition, in terms of its democracy definition and 
conceptualization, Polity IV is more fruitful for this research’s statistical results than FH and 
Chapter 6 addresses the reasons why the source of regime scores is Polity IV in depth.  Polity 
IV assigns scores for countries from -10 to +10 depending on competitive and participatory 
attributes of democracy.  I reframe Polity IV scores, as often been practiced antecedently 
(Benson and Kugler, 1998; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Whitten-Woodring, 2009) and 
define five types of regime – autocracy (-10 to -6), closed anocracy (-5 to 0), open anocracy (1 
to 5), democracy (6 to 9) and full democracy (10).   
 To reduce varied components of regimes that generate ambiguity, I recode five regime 
types ordinally, unlike some of the scholars who use binary categorization for democracy 
(Przeworski et al., 2000).  The measure of regime types here is not dichotomous because they 
“fail to – indeed, cannot – capture” partial democracies (Epstein et al., 2006, 555).  Yet, three-
category scale (autocracy, anocracy, and democracy) is also ambiguous, as it lumps diverse 
characteristics of anocracies into one scale (Treier and Jackman, 2008).  Thus, this study 
divides anocracies into two and generates another regime type for nations with 10-perfect-
score, called “full democracies” to avoid lumping characteristics into one types of regime, as 
Goldstone et al. (2010) suggested (p. 195).     
 Although the central mechanism that triggers protest is how individuals react to the 
state repression, it is fallacious to gainsay that the political system itself influences protest.  
Autocracy is not synonym with repression.  Autocracy and democracy are systems, and 
repression is a policy carried out by the government.  However, how does repression under a 
particular political system affect protests?  The effect of repression depends on the level of 
regime type is interactive and the interaction is measured with the product of repression and 
regime type scores.   
 Violation of freedom of media and domestic movement is also expected to have an 
impact on the frequency of protests.  Restrictions on these two types of freedom should 
decrease the total number of protests because they limit mobilization.  It is important to note 
that freedom of media and domestic movement are two of the attributes of democracy.  
Especially press freedom is widely recognized as a key component of democracy (Bollen, 
1980; Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 1999; Choi and James, 2007; Schedler, 2010).  Data for freedom 
of the press are drawn from Global Media Freedom Dataset that covers the globe from 1948 
 29 
through 2012.  It is a categorical scale from 1 to 3 indicating that 1 is free press, 2 is imperfectly 
free, and 3 is not free (Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle, 2015).  As for the data on freedom 
of domestic movement, CIRI Human Rights Data Project includes information on over 200 
countries from 1981 to 2011, and it also has a categorical three scale measurement.  A score of 
0 is an indicator of severe restriction, a score of 1 somewhat restriction and a score of 2 
unrestricted freedom of domestic movement.  The variable denotes citizens’ freedom to travel 
within their own country (Cingranelli et al., 2014).   
 Economic development has always been a great personal concern for most people and 
thought to be one of the primary causes for deprivation and grievances (Gurr, 1970).  Contrary 
to grievance arguments, Hypothesis 4 maintains that grievances induced by weak economic 
conditions do not increase the number of protests.  I measure wealth with logged GDP per 
capita,3 instead of overall GDP, GNP, poverty and inequality indexes.  I do not include nations’ 
overall GDP in the analysis because the use of GDP without its share per capita is misleading.  
A country may have very high GDP; however, when distributed, citizens might be claiming 
only a small share in extremely populated nations.  GDP per capita avails this study better than 
GNP since the GDP per capita, unlike GNP, “includes all economic activity that occurs within 
the borders of the given country” (Whitten-Woodring, 2009, 609).   
 Finally, I carefully use the word wealth, not poverty because absolute poverty, as Gurr 
(1970) puts it, is not “necessarily thought to be unjust or irremediable by those who experience 
it” (p. 24).  Without a “reason to expect or hope for more than they can achieve,” the poor are 
usually content with what they already have (Runciman, 1966, 9).  Moreover, poverty and 
inequality data such as GINI have a substantial amount of missing values for the timeframe 
and countries I intend to research.  Poverty and inequality are two economic measurements that 
require further research for studies with large-N observations, like this one.  Thus, the measure 
of economic conditions is wealth, not income inequality or poverty.  Data for GDP per capita 
is obtained from the Quality of Government Dataset (QOG) (Teorell et al., 2017).   
 With respect to control variables, large population is anticipated to be positively 
associated with protest because large population makes government monitoring on citizens 
difficult and recruitment easier for disaffected individuals and groups (Gurr and Moore, 1997; 
Fearon and Laitin, 2003).  Population is also logged to account for skewness and the data on 
population4 are pulled from UNdata.  Moreover, since entrenched and long-lived nations may 
                                               
3 GDP per capita is computed in current US dollar 
4 Values represent the estimated population with medium variant.   
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be associated with lower levels of political conflict (Hegre et al., 2001; Gurr, 1993) and newer 
regimes have greater likelihood to suffer (Levitsky and Way, 2012), I control for regime 
duration, in terms of the numbers of years that elapse without a major change in its political 
institutions (Saxton, 2005).  I draw on Boix-Miller-Rosato Dichotomous Coding of Democracy 
(Boix et al., 2012) for regime duration.   
 Furthermore, ethnic fractionalization is another factor expected to affect the total 
number of protests negatively.  Based on Collier et al. (2001), I argue that it is the ethnic 
dominance and heterogeneity that incite conflict.  The initial plan was to utilize Baldwin and 
Huber’s (2010) dataset for ethnic fractionalization.  Nonetheless, it is limited to forty-six 
countries; therefore, ethnic fractionalization is drawn from QOG.  QOG defines ethnicity as a 
combination of racial and linguistic components, and fractionalization as the probability that 
two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not share particular 
characteristics.  A high number of fractionalization purports less probability that the two will 
share these characteristics (Teorell et al., 2017).   
 Ultimately, I consider the effect of agricultural land (% of land area), which connotes 
the share of arable land area under permanent crops and pastures and the data is obtained from 
the World Development Indicators dataset.  Despite the RA theorists’ criticism on grievance-
based explanations of peasant rebellions (Lichbach, 1994), the contribution peasantry makes 
to historically great revolutions ought not to be ignored (Skocpol, 1979).  In addition, goods 
produced from agriculture may reinforce financing protest and rural areas may serve as a base 
for the opposition (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).  Hence, I expect countries where agriculture plays 
a significant role in the society to have a positive impact on the number of protests. 
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4.3 Model and Estimation 
 The objective of this thesis is to explain the causal relationship between the dependent 
variable – the total number of protests across countries- and explanatory variables I have 
outlined thus far.  I chose multiple regression analysis as the model of this study for two 
reasons.  First, multiple regression evinces valuable information about the combined effects of 
independent variables.  Second, multiple regression analysis allows us to discriminate between 
the effects of the independent variables by quantifying the impact of each explanatory variable.  
Some of the independent variables may be correlated such as regime type and repression or 
GDP per capita and media freedom.  However, multivariate regression makes allowances for 
high correlation (Dougherty, 1992).  Thus, I use multiple regression for this large-N cross-
national analysis.   
 In total, this study presents eleven models.5  I begin with a regression analysis with the 
dependent variable, protest from WHIV dataset, which constitutes the primary model of the 
thesis.  Then, I compare the findings of the primary model with protest data from MM.  Hence, 
I run two separate multiple regression analyses for two dependent variables from two different 
sources, namely WHIV and MM.6  Model 3 demonstrates the analysis of the dependent 
variable, Protest WHIV without the interaction variable.   
 Initially, the goal was to extend the comparison of the primary model with an additional 
regression analysis using CNTS.  Considering this plan, CNTS played a role in case selection 
process.7  However, I report summary statistics and regression results of protest variable from 
CNTS in Appendix A because of its reliability issues, which are, in fact, common for protest 
datasets since they rely on news reports.  In some countries, local media might be operated or 
heavily influenced by the state and, consequently, some protests lack news coverage and go 
unpublished.  International corporate media are not usually worried about the political pressure 
coming from autocratic nations; however, not all protests are news-worthy.  Therefore, small-
scale protests may go unnoticed in this scenario as well.  Domestic conflict data on CNTS 
solely rely on one source (The New York Times), and, as a result, almost 70% of the total 
                                               
5 Models 10 and 11 located in Appendix. 
6 Although these dependent variables are coming from two different sources, they consist of same three components i.e., 
strikes, riots and demonstrations.  CNTS also have the same definition.   
 
7 As previously mentioned, the dataset is composed of common country-year observations on WHIV, MM and CNTS.  I 
excluded a country or a year if it did not exist in one of the three datasets.   
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amount of protests are coded as 0.8  Not every country has to have protests every year.  Some 
do, and some do not.  Nevertheless, the absence of protests on CNTS is excessive, in 
comparison to WHIV and MM.  Both WHIV and MM might also be suffering from 
underreporting, but the reliability issues of CNTS is more salient.  For instance, Bangladesh in 
2000 faced a violent wave of demonstrations and generals strikes, which resulted in dozens of 
deaths (Rashiduzzaman, 2001).  Similarly, the UK had significant live animal export protests 
in 1994 (Joyce, 2016).  While WHIV and MM manage to capture these incidents, CNTS shows 
no anti-government protests, riots or general strikes in Bangladesh and the UK in these years.  
As a consequence, I only report results of CNTS in the appendix.   
 Next three models check the robustness of the primary data with standard error 
estimation techniques since panel data have some drawbacks such as omitted variable bias, 
heteroscedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation.  Models 4 through 6 handle these 
potential problems with lagged dependent variable, robust and clustered standard error 
techniques, respectively.  Note that panel data covers the years from 1990 through 2004 and 
an omitted dependent variable bias may occur if the number of protests before 1990 affects 
protests in 1990 and onwards.  For instance, we may observe a remarkable number of protests 
in the former Soviet states in 1990 due to the dissolution of the USSR started in 1989.  Put 
differently, protests in 1989 could be the reason behind protests in 1990 but the dataset lacks 
protest reports from 1989.  Fixed effect estimator controls for this bias.  However, fixed effect 
is not very useful when the dependent variable does not vary within years substantially (Beck 
and Katz, 2001).  None of the models contains a fixed effect option and the reason is that the 
lagged dependent variable in Model 4 demonstrates that temporal variance is discreet and a 
model with fixed effect is not necessary.  By lagging the dependent variable, Model 4 thereby 
aims to demonstrate that the primary model does not suffer from omitted variable bias.   
 Due to high correlation of different units within the same time frame, biased standard 
error estimates caused by heteroscedasticity and observations with large residuals, default 
standard error settings can largely overstate estimator precision (Cameron and Miller, 2015).  
Model 5 aims to improve the precision of standard error estimates through dealing with these 
concerns.  In case of heteroscedasticity, robust option is usually stauncher than default OLS 
because OLS makes the assumption that errors are both identically distributed and independent; 
whereas, robust option relaxes the assumption of identical distribution.  Furthermore, robust 
controls and corrects the problems in the standard error.   
                                               
8 See Table A1 in Appendix A 
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 Model 6 clusters observations into countries and relaxes OLS’ latter assumption.  In 
other words, it demonstrates that units can be correlated within countries but would be 
independent between them.  Since cluster option allows correlation between observations and 
typically has more estimation variance, Model 6 may exhibit larger standard errors and higher 
p-values.  Model 6 is an important part of the robustness check because robust is implied with 
cluster, which checks the correlation of different units both for the same period of time and the 
same units for different years.  More importantly, failure to control for cluster can misleadingly 
conduce to small standard errors, narrow confidence intervals and large t-statistics, resulting in 
Type I error (Thompson, 2011).   
 In models 7 through 9, three different measures of democracy9 and their interaction 
with repression replace Polity IV to show how each different measure affects protest and other 
explanatory variables.  Models intend to provide evidence that all respected regime type 
measurements suffer from a conceptual problem at a certain extent and the level of civil 
liberties show variances among democracies.  Thus, the use of Polity IV’s regime scores to 
define regime types serves the purpose of this thesis better than the other measures.   
 Finally, the equation of the primary model for multiple regression is as stated below.  
Next, I present the results of the analyses in Chapter 5 and continue with the discussion of 
findings in Chapter 6.   
Protest WHIV = – β0 – β1Repression(PTS) – β2Regime Type + β3Repression*Regime Type 
+ β4Domestic Movement – β5Media Freedom + β6Ln(GDP/capita) – β7Regime Duration + 
β8Ln(Population) – β9Ethnic Fractionalization + β10Agricultural Land + ε  
                                               
9 Freedom House (FH), Electoral Democracy and Liberal Democracy are in Models 7, 8 and 9, respectively.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
 
 Model 1 through 6 (except Model 4) analyze 2,113 observations out of 2,322.  As seen 
in Table 2, primary model (Model 1) verifies all hypotheses by elucidating that frequency of 
protest is significant with all of the explanatory variables, except for regime duration.  R-square 
indicates that independent and control variables in Model 1 explain 38.8% of the variance in 
the dependent variable.  The second model demonstrates almost identical results, confirming 
primary model’s results.  Media freedom in Model 2 is insignificant, casting doubt on media 
freedom’s significant causal relationship found in Model 1.  Apart from Model 3 that excludes 
the interaction variable, none of the models captures significance for regime duration at 5% 
level.  Four out of ten variables are statistically significant at 99.9% level on both Model 1 and 
2, displaying great confidence in findings.  F-test shows that variables in the regression analysis 
are jointly significant.   
 Models 4 through 6 (Table 2) provide a robustness check for the results in Model 1.  
Model 4 indicates that the primary model does not suffer from omitted dependent variable bias, 
but Model 5 hints the existence of some heteroscedasticity.  When clustered, contemporaneous 
correlation in Model 6 appears to increase standard errors and p-values; however, cardinal 
explanatory variables are still significant.  The last three models (Table 3) include different 
regime measures, instead of Polity IV and serve the purpose of supporting the findings in the 
first six models.  Nonetheless, models 7, 8 and 9 demonstrate that the conceptual problem of 
regime types is general, not limited to Polity IV but Polity IV is still more useful for this study.  
Models 7 through 9 not only fail to capture a causal explanation for non-democracies, but also 
display insignificant results for mobilization variables (freedom of media and domestic 
movement).  The aggregated regime scores in FH and V-Dem contain these variables and 
regard them as civil liberties, which causes high correlation.  Ultimately, it is essential to 
control for multicollinearity, mainly if a model contains interaction variables due to their 
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tendency to cause variance inflation.  Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test indicates that there 
are no concerns regarding multicollinearity.10   
 
 
 
 
5.1 Findings 
Repression, Regime and Interaction: Results of the Model 3 in Table 2 demonstrate that 
repression and regime type are not statistically significant with protest when we assume that 
these variables do not interact with each other.  However, the primary model, along with Model 
                                               
10 Refer to Chapter 5.2 for detailed explanation. 
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2, 5 and 6, illustrates that repression, regime type, and their interaction behave largely as 
expected.  All three variables are statistically significant within 99.9% confidence interval in 
Model 1.  Had regime type taken a value of zero,11 we could say that as states coerce more, 
they experience fewer numbers of protest.  Identically, if repression was not ordinal and had a 
value of zero, we could interpret the finding as autocratic countries experience more protests 
and, conversely, fewer protests are held in democracies.  Although it may seem to constitute a 
discrepancy, both interpretations would be consistent with previous studies (Muller and Opp, 
1986; Opp, 1990; Carey, 2006).  Nevertheless, it perspicuously requires an explanation, for 
which we must first ask: How do we explain the findings of repression and regime type if 
neither variable takes the value zero?  And, then, how is protest affected by the level of state 
repression conditional on regime type?   
 The interaction of Repression (PTS) and RegimeType is the answer.  The interaction 
variable (Repression*RegimeType) alone is not very informative unless we calculate the 
marginal effect and look at t-statistics.  95% confidence intervals around the marginal effect 
line in Figure 2 enable us to determine the conditions, under which level of repression has a 
statistically significant effect on the number of protests.  As Brambor et al. (2006) put it plainly, 
the effect is statistically significant “whenever the upper and lower bounds of the confidence 
interval are both above (or below) the zero line” (p. 76).  Since T-values of closed and open 
anocracies are below 1.96, the marginal effect is substantially meaningful and significant only 
for autocracy, democracy, and full democracy.  The figure explicates that repression has a 
reductive effect on the number of total protests when the regime is autocracy.  This reductive 
effect of repression declines, as countries get more democratic.  Nevertheless, note that both 
types of anocracies are statistically insignificant.  We can conclude that states benefit from 
repression to retain their autocratic status quo; however, repression has a positive (increasing) 
effect on protest if the regime is democracy or fully democratic.   
                                               
11 Each coefficient value and sign are individually meaningful only when other variables can be hold constant at zero. 
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Mobilization: In Model 1, both freedoms of domestic movement and media are statistically 
significant.  However, p-values display different levels of significance.  Freedom of domestic 
movement is significant at the 5% level; whereas, freedom of media at 1%.  Greater freedom 
of domestic movement permits mobilization to occur and, consequently, people organize or 
attend protests when they are free to move within their country, thanks to the lack of fear of 
persecution.  Results on media freedom also lend support on hypotheses formulated in Chapter 
3.  Countries that allow freedom of media12 are at risk of experiencing a higher number of 
protests.  People become disaffected or are informed about planned protests if the media is 
disinterested.  Nonetheless, despite being attributes of our democracy definition (Bollen, 1980; 
Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 1999; Choi and James, 2007; Schedler, 2010), both types of freedom 
show variances within democracies in a reasonably substantial amount of observations, which 
I will address in the Chapter 6 with detail. 
Economic Conditions: Logged GDP per capita has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with the dependent variable in Model 1, delineating that the probability that this 
relationship did not occur by chance is 99.9%.  As the estimated coefficient value depicts, it 
                                               
12 Table 2 shows negative coefficient for freedom of media due to the direction of the coding for media freedom.  As 
explained in Chapter 4, 1 is free, 2 imperfectly free and 3 not-free press. 
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has a large contribution to the effect on protest.  It suggests that states with economically 
grieved individuals do not face more demonstrations, contrary to theories of RD.  In fact, 
countries, in which distribution of wealth per person is greater, protest activities become more 
frequent (Brady et al., 1995; Schussman and Soule, 2005; Regan and Norton, 2005).  
Economically developed countries experience protests more often, and this could be interpreted 
as the rich either want to get richer or fear that they will lose their possession.  Alternatively, 
the poor in richer countries tend to protest more.   
Control Variables: Coefficient value indicates that regime duration has a negative relationship 
with the total number of protests, as predicted.  However, it fails to attain significance at 5% 
level and, yet, the insignificant outcome is consistent with previous studies (Gurr and Moore, 
1997; Saxton, 2006).  Logged population and agricultural land area (% of land area) are both 
significant for p-value<0.001.  While logged population has a large positive conditional effect 
on the number of protests, the agriculture appears to be also positive, but weak.  High 
population complicates monitoring citizen activities for the state.  Refractory citizens under 
weak surveillance organize faster and more efficient.  Greater agricultural land has a 
strengthening force on mobilization.  Agricultural goods may be used to support protest 
activities financially.  The direction of ethnic fractionalization’s effect is negative, and the 
model displays a p-value lower than 0.001 for ethnicity.  Results adduce support for the 
argument that ethnic dominance entails conflict, not vice versa.   
 
 
 
5.2 Robustness 
 This thesis sets out three strategies to check the robustness of Model 1.  First, I compare 
the findings of Model 1 with Model 2, in which the source of the dependent variable is MM 
dataset.  The expectation is that both protest data should provide similar results.  The vital part 
of the first strategy is to ensure that the dependent variables of protest in Model 1 and 2 carry 
the same components of protests, which are designed to be riots, demonstrations and general 
strikes per country-year.  I exclude an additional model with CNTS due to large amounts of 
underreported protest activities, which poses a threat to reliability.  Second, unbalanced data in 
panel datasets may cause errors due to contemporaneous correlation and heteroscedasticity 
(Bailey and Katz, 2011).  Therefore, I run three models to detect whether the inferences of 
Model 1 are biased or incorrect.  Third, the robustness check includes three more models, using 
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regime scores from FH and V-Dem, instead of Polity IV.  The goal is to show that Polity IV 
explains protest better, despite its imperfect definition of regimes. 
 Model 2 explains the variance in the dependent variable with R-square 0.1348 – much 
less than Model 1.  Model 2 indicates that all of the significant findings in Model 1 is robust, 
except for media freedom.  Although media freedom in Model 2 confirms the coefficient sign 
in the primary model, it fails the significance test at 5% level.  Regime duration is statistically 
insignificant in both models.  Regime type, logged GDP per capita and ethnic fractionalization 
in Model 2 satisfy statistical significance at a lower p-value than Model 1.  Freedom of 
domestic movement in Model 2 is significant for p-value< 0.01; whereas, p-value < 0.05 in 
Model 1.  One of the most salient differences between the first two models is that all of the 
estimated coefficient effects of explanatory variables on Model 1 have a substantially stronger 
effect on the dependent variable than Model 2.  The dependent variable on Model 2 
systematically reports fewer protests per country/year than the dependent variable on Model 1.  
To be precise, only 20% of the observations in Model 2 are greater than Model 1.  As a matter 
of course, coefficient values and R-square are lower in one of the models.   
 Regardless of lower coefficient values, freedom of domestic movement, repression, 
regime type and marginal effect of repression conditional on regime type provide similar 
results.  All aforementioned variables are statistically significant and have the same coefficient 
signs.  Repression in Model 2 has a reductive effect on the total number of protests if the regime 
is autocracy and a converse effect if the regime is democracy and full democracy.  T-values for 
closed and open anocracies are below 1.96 critical value on both models; therefore, the model 
fails to verify the statistical significance of repression’s conditional effect of both anocracies 
on protest.13  VIF tests on both models demonstrate that all independent and control variables, 
except for the interaction variable and two interacted variables, are below Diamantopoulous 
and Siguaw’s (2006) 3.3 excellent value.14  Repression(PTS), RegimeType and 
Repression*RegimeType are still below the score of 10, pointing no signs of multicollinearity 
(Hair et al., 1995).   
 Panel data comes with potential flaws by its nature and “often show non-spherical 
errors because of contemporaneous correlation across the units and unit level 
heteroscedasticity” (Bailey and Katz, 2011, 1).  Regression analysis in Model 1 may have 
overestimated (or underestimated) standard errors, variances, confidence intervals and p-values 
                                               
13 Refer to Appendix B for t-Statistics results of the interaction variable and the marginal effect graph. 
14 For VIF test results, see Appendix B Table B4. 
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since estimations may be biased or incorrect, as a result of omitted variables, observations with 
limited of variances, autocorrelation, and large residuals, along with heteroscedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation.  Considering that the number of protests held in a nation prior to 
199015 might influence the protests from 1990 onwards, Model 4 controls for omitted 
dependent variable bias by lagging the dependent variable, Protest WHIV.  The lagged 
dependent variable is statistically significant with the dependent variable for p-value<0.001.  
The same bias poses a threat to independent variables as well.  For example, past repression 
may influence people’s decision to protest (Maher and Peterson, 2008; Kim et al., 2014).  
Nonetheless, standard errors and coefficient values do not display a meaningful change when 
repression is lagged.16   
 Model 5 controls for heteroscedasticity and handles correlation of different units for the 
same time span.  When dependent and independent variables in Model 1 regressed with the 
option robust, half of the variables have lower standard errors. three variables have larger 
standard errors and two are almost the same.  Model 5 points out two important issues.  First, 
the primary model slightly suffers from heteroscedasticity.  Standard error values in Model 1 
differ from Model 5 but the difference is relatively small.  Had there been more 
heteroscedasticity, the robust option would have probably displayed bigger changes.  Second, 
higher standard error means higher variance (because standard error is the square root of 
variance) and the higher variance is, the more unbiased estimates analysists produce.  Although 
robust option in Model 5 provides more precise standard error, confidence interval and t-
statistics estimates, hypothesis testing of the five of the independent variables with lower 
standard errors may be more inaccurate than the rest.   
 Model 6 introduces another robust standard error technique, in which standard error is 
adjusted for 150 clusters in country codes (ccode).  In addition to the robust option in the 
previous model, cluster checks the correlation of different units, not only for the same period 
of time, but also the same units for different years.  Clustered standard errors appear to be 
conspicuously inflated, in comparison to the original standard errors.  Clustered standard errors 
are up to (approximately) four times larger than the standard errors in the primary model.  
Moreover, among ten independent variables in Model 6, only repression, the interaction of 
repression and regime type, logged GDP/capita and logged population are statistically 
significant.  However, it is not unexceptional that clustered standard error estimates “are 
                                               
15 Once again, note that the time frame of the dataset is from 1990 through 2014. 
16 For model with lagged repression and the marginal effect graph, see Appendix B. 
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several times larger than default standard errors that ignore such correlation” (Cameron and 
Miller, 2015, 2).  It is also typical that more than half of the variables are statistically 
insignificant because cluster option “leads to over-rejection” when there are few clusters (ibid, 
24).  Overall, results of the robustness check with cluster option is still satisfactory because 
significant variables are the key components of the theory.   
 
 
 
5.3 Further Tests 
 In models 1 through 6, analyses are based on the regime scores of Polity IV.  A problem 
with this measure is that it assigns scores considering governments’ performance on 
participation and competition in elections but undermines the contribution individual rights 
and freedoms make to the quantification of regimes.  It is possible that isolation of civil liberties 
from regime scores may affect the relationship between regime type and protest.  To check this 
possibility models 7 through 9 test to determine whether different measures of regimes have 
different impacts on protest when measure comprises civil liberties.  Numerous datasets 
measure regimes; however, only two of them have the least amount of missing values, namely 
Freedom House (FH) and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.   
 Models in Table 3 analyze the effect of FH scores, electoral democracy index and 
liberal democracy index on protest, which come from V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2017).  FH in 
Model 7 is a three-scale ordinal data17 combines the average ratings for political rights and 
civil liberties.  Electoral democracy in Model 8 and liberal democracy in Model 9 are five-
scale measures of democracy.18  Electoral democracy variable attempts to measure the extent 
of ideal electoral democracy achieved in its fullest sense and liberal democracy, the extent of 
ideal liberal democracy achieved in its fullest sense. 
 None of these three measures used to replace Polity IV show statistical significance 
with the number of protests.  Repression is significant only in the Model 7 and contrary to 
expectations, its coefficient has a positive sign.  Nevertheless, for models with interaction 
variables, what matters is how each interacted variable behave.  In addition to “not free” nations 
in FH, “closed autocratic” and “autocratic” in V-Dem are below the critical value for t-
statistics.  Nonetheless, all three regime variables in the last three models verify that repression 
                                               
17 Freedom House: 1 Free, 2 Partly Free 3 Not Free. 
18 V-Dem: 0.0 Closed Autocratic, 0.25 Autocratic, 0.50 Ambivalent, 0.75 Minimally Democratic and 1.00 Democratic. 
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increases protest as governments score higher score on democracy.19  Perhaps, the most 
important implication of the use of FH and democracy indexes of V-Dem is that mobilization 
variables, freedom of domestic movement and media appear to be insignificant.  Such finding 
is far from being shocking and it signals a conceptual problem of regime types.  How other 
measures of regimes apart from Polity IV affect protest and why FH and V-Dem do not work 
as well as Polity IV will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.   
  
                                               
19 See Appendix B for t-statistics results and the marginal effect graph. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 Findings, in general, follow the argument that the cost of collective action is the 
essential determinant of the total number of annual protests held in 158 countries from 1990 to 
2004.  Results are consistent and can be interpreted with rational and value-expectancy.20  
Repression increases costs of action and, thus, high repression has an inverse causal 
relationship with protest.  Autocracies are known to be more repressive, conducing to the 
assumption that they would face fewer protests, but results show otherwise.  If regime type is 
autocracy, protests occur more frequently because protest is the only viable option to voice 
concerns in non-democracies.  Nevertheless, citizens of democratic countries, where 
institutions promote compromise and cooperation, have the capability of expressing or solving 
their problems before taking their action to streets.   
 In other words, regression analysis concludes that states’ repressive policies have a 
reductive effect on the number of protests due to high costs of collective action.  Yet, the 
frequency of protests increases if the regime type is autocracy, despite routinely and 
systematically imposing repressive policies.  Interaction of repression and regime type solve 
this dilemma.  Repression has a decreasing impact on protest for autocracy but a positive effect 
for democracy and full democracy.  Cooperative and compromising features of democracy 
create three perceptions: concessions from the government, low cost for collective activities 
and higher probability to achieve the desired public good (Muller and Opp, 1986).  As Rasler 
(1996) puts it, concessions “produce more protest behavior” (p. 145).  Regime type alone may 
show that frequency of protests increases, as regimes lean towards autocracy.  Nonetheless, 
once regime is employed in the repression-protest relationship, repressive states experience 
                                               
20 The first model maintains that individuals do no act collectively because actors are likely to think that they can receive the 
benefits of the public good without participation (Olson, 1971; Hardin, 1982; Lichbach, 1995).  The latter argues that people 
will rise up if they believe that protesting will achieve the public good.  They will be less inclined to protest if they expect 
repression (Muller and Opp, 1986; Finkel et al., 1989; Opp and Roehl, 1990; Rasler, 1996; Carey, 2006).   
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fewer protests should the nation is autocracy.  In a nutshell, repression works in autocracies 
but incites protest in democracies and full democracies.  It has a negative effect for closed 
anocracies and positive for open anocracies; however, neither closed anocracy nor open 
anocracy is statistically significant.   
 The explanation of the causal relationship between mobilization and protest is based on 
the same cost-benefit argument.  As supported by the literature (Myers, 2000; Andrews and 
Biggs, 2006; Whitten-Woodring, 2009; Casper and Tyson, 2014), the primary model indicates 
fewer protests in countries, where the government limits media independence and neutrality.  
In the absence of criticism of government through the channels of media, individuals do not 
organize or partake in demonstrations.  They are afraid to mobilize against the government; 
therefore, they remain compliant.  However, note that Model 2 reveals an insignificant 
relationship for media.  Furthermore, constraints on freedom of domestic movement evince the 
same relationship in both models.  State control of movement within a country makes 
coordination and organization difficult for mobilization (Barry et al., 2014).  When 
mobilization has undesired and costly consequences, individuals are dissuaded from protesting.  
Alternatively, countries with higher levels of domestic movement freedom reduce costs of 
collective action and protest events eventuate from easier mobilization.   
 All of the findings so far draw one fundamental conclusion: protests occur more 
frequently when people can protest without concerns about safety.  This notion constitutes the 
foundation of rational actor models on internal political conflict.  In this regard, the positive 
effect of wealth on protest is not an exception.  Greater GDP/capita entails the number of 
protests to increase due to two reasons.  First, people who experience absolute poverty are 
grateful for what they already have, but the rich are always afraid to lose their assets.  
Therefore, it is the rich that have incentives to act collectively, not the poor.  Second, protesters 
need resources to start or sustain a popular movement.  Wealth ensures that individuals have 
resources for that purpose.   
 Thus far, I have demonstrated that repression, media21 and domestic movement have 
an effect on protest.  These two variables form the essence of this study, not only because their 
causal relationships with protests are statistically verified, but also, they are cardinal 
dimensions that define regime types.  Each dimension is an important variable that helps us 
understand why some countries are exposed to larger numbers of protests.  Additionally, these 
                                               
21 Note that media freedom is not significant in Model 2, in which the dependent variable is Protest MM. 
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dimensions are distinctively vital to this study since they reflect the image of democracy and 
constitute some of the core attributes of democracy.   
 Despite their individual contribution to the model, we still instinctively presume that 
democracies and full democracies do not practice political terror on its citizens, allow media 
freedom and movement within the country.  If a state controls the media, restricts domestic 
movement or exercises political violence on its citizens, we hesitate to classify its regime as a 
democracy.  Then, why do we need to test all three dimensions of democracy in addition to 
regime types?  First, as these three variables are subsets of democracy, the notion that the 
regression analysis might suffer from multicollinearity is plausible but inaccurate for this 
thesis.22  Second, the absence of repression, high levels of media and domestic movement 
freedoms are subsumed under a broad category, i.e., democracy, and, therefore, they are not 
expected to vary within democracies, but they surprisingly do.  Figure 3 illustrates how three 
characteristics of democracy vary among and between regime types.   
 
 Numbers above each bar belong to a certain regime type and represent the number of 
country-year observations.  There is a total of 2113 observations in the multivariate regression 
analysis, 1011 of which are classified as either democracy or full democracy (See, Table 4).  
                                               
22 VIF test reveals no signs of multicollinearity. 
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Among these observations, there are only a few cases of full democracies that repress and limit 
domestic movement at least at an intermediate level – 31 country-years, to be exact.   
 
 It is evident that three cases of full democracy in the bottom subgraph that enforce 
repressive policies are residuals and may be ignored.  Nonetheless, as we move from full 
democracy to democracy, the graph elucidates that observations, once thought to be extreme 
cases, eventually accrue and cast doubt on our universal definition and quantitative measure of 
regime types.  In fact, democracies perform almost as poor as open anocracies on media 
freedom.  More interestingly, only one-third of the observations categorized under democracy 
and full democracy rarely or almost never repress, enjoy free media and have unrestricted 
domestic movement.23  It is then imperative to ask ourselves why there is a substantial amount 
of variation within democracies.   
 
 There are two reasons why some democracies or full democracies tend to display 
behaviors that are incompatible with the norms of democracy.  First, dichotomous and 
trichotomous scales omit transitional regimes.  This omission causes countries to be 
categorized as autocracy or democracy; whereas, they are, in fact, neither.  Some nations 
systematically violate civil liberties, but they hold regular and tolerably free elections.  Some 
may justifiably assume that cases like Tunisia, Ukraine and Russia are too liberal to be labeled 
as authoritarian when compared to North Korea or Saudi Arabia.  In like manner, some 
                                               
23 The number of democracy and full democracy country-year observations that score 1 (free) on Media Freedom, 2 
(unrestricted) on Domestic Movement AND below 3 (2 for rarely and 1 for almost never) on Repression(PTS) divided by 
the total number of democracy and full democracy country-year observations.   
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democracies are too restrictive to count as a democracy despite indisputably free, fair and 
regular elections such as the US, Hungary, and Kenya.  Moreover, when regimes are coded as 
a dummy – 0 for autocracy and 1 for democracy– we do not measure autocracy but only the 
absence of democracy.  Unless the model requires regime types to be binary explicitly, 
dichotomization of regimes should be avoided for the betterment of analyses.  Knowing this, 
none of the models in this thesis contains dichotomous or trichotomous scales of regime types.  
The expansion of narrow regime scales is a perspicacious attempt but still problematic.  FH 
offered a seven-point rating system and categorized the average ratings under three ordinal 
responses until 2003.  Polity IV still scores regimes on a total of twenty-one points.  
Nevertheless, large scales do not treat the disease either, since FH and Polity have “flawed” 
and “questionable aggregation technique” (Coppedge et al., 2011, 249).  
 Second, no matter what kind of taxonomy scholars implement, they are likely to 
encounter conceptual problems because of the wanting attributes of regimes.  Regime types 
should be controlling for dimensions of regimes by default.  Nonetheless, our definition – 
especially, of democracy – is insufficient to capture the concept as a whole.  Regime scores on 
Polity IV are mainly based on competition and participation.  Yet, the election is not the only 
component and democracy is more than a mere apparatus for choosing political leaders, despite 
the suggestion that it is (Schumpeter, 2013).  In addition to fair, free and regular elections, civil 
rights and liberties are also some of its dimensions (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992).  Table 5 
demonstrates that there are 677 cases labeled as democracy and full democracy that exhibit 
non-democratic behaviors.  Figure 3 shows twenty-four observations classified as democracy 
where heavy (maximum level) repression is a part of daily life and twenty-eight full 
democracies where domestic movement is not unrestricted.  Perhaps, some of these cases 
should never have been linked with democracy or full democracy.  The goal here is not to 
imply that democratic governments never treat their citizens unjustly or harm them.  However, 
due to the exclusion of civil liberties in Polity IV, some democratic and fully democratic 
countries appear to be indistinguishable from non-democracies. 
 The concept of democracy should be comprehensive and meet further conditions such 
as civil and political liberties (Dahl, 1989; Schmitter and Karl, 1996; Held, 2006; Tilly, 2007; 
Schedler, 2010).  The solution of the conceptual problem of democracy is the strategy of 
increasing differentiation (Sartori, 1970).  Particularly, media freedom, domestic movement 
freedom and freedom from coercion can play a vital role in this strategy.  Howbeit, apart from 
Polity IV, datasets on regime types and democracy that take civil liberties into account are 
available, e.g. FH and V-Dem.  Then, three questions arise: First, how should we interpret the 
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results when Polity IV is replaced with FH, Electoral Democracy, and Liberal Democracy? 
Second, why do results differ from Polity IV?  Third, why does this study insist on Polity IV? 
 To answer the first question, note that none of three regime type variables used as 
replacements for Polity IV is statistically significant (Table 3).  Therefore, it is inconclusive 
whether the level of democracy in a given country affect protest, except for Polity IV.  
Repression has a causal relationship with protest only when Freedom House replaces Polity 
IV.  However, its coefficient sign is positive, notwithstanding a negatively significant 
relationship in models 1, 2, 5, 6, and 11.  The interaction variables in each one of the last three 
models provide the same results with the primary model: repression increases protests if the 
state is a democracy.  Nevertheless, “not-free” nations (FH) and “closed autocracies” (V-Dem) 
are insignificant, unlike the primary model.  More importantly, freedom of media and domestic 
movement also fail to pass the significance test in none of the models from 7 through 9.  In 
Model 7, there are 413 cases of “free” states; in Model 8, 474 cases of “minimally democracies” 
and “democracies”; and in Model 9, 244 cases of “minimally democracies” and “democracies”, 
in which governments exercise repression, control the media or restrict domestic movement.24   
 This interpretation leads to the second question.  Findings of Model 7 through 9 have 
stark differences from Model 1, and as well as Model 2.  Contrary to the first two models, 
protest’s causal relationship with freedom of media and domestic movement is indeterminant 
in models 7, 8 and 9.  Although these two variables are indicators of mobilization, they are also 
civil liberties.  The definition of freedom in FH and electoral and liberal democracies in V-
Dem contain not only media freedom but also domestic movement.  Therefore, when FH 
country statuses and V-Dem democracy indexes replace Polity IV as a regime type variable, 
models 7, 8, and 9 end up measuring freedom of media and domestic movement twice.  Double 
measurement leads into a false notion that mobilization variables (freedom of media and 
domestic movement) are not causally related to protest.   
 When we exclude essential factors such as repression, media and domestic movement 
freedom from the concept of democracy, we limit ourselves with an imperfect definition, which 
then leads to flawed measurements, like the ones we widely use.  Imperfect definitions and 
flawed measurements inhibit generation of empirical studies that depict a stronger analysis of 
protest.  If Polity IV lacks civil liberties and, therefore, is a flawed measurement with an 
imperfect definition, why does this study tenaciously use Polity IV in the primary model?  First, 
autocratic behaviors also seem to exist in democratic states in Freedom House and democracy 
                                               
24 Refer to Appendix C. 
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indexes of V-Dem.  Even though variation is not as high as Polity IV, free and democratic 
states repress, restrict media and domestic movement in these two datasets.  Thus, the definition 
of democracy is unsatisfactory regardless of the measure.  Second, mobilization variables of 
this study are also some of the components of democracy definition in FH and V-Dem.  
Measuring the same things distorts the results, causing very high correlation and 
multicollinearity.  Lastly, FH is not even a measurement of democracy because it, in fact, 
measures freedom.  In addition, V-Dem’s Electoral and Liberal Democracy measures are 
specifically democracy indexes.  Although V-Dem authors label states with the lowest scores 
as autocracies, they, in essence, measure the least democratic states, not the most autocracies.  
The definition of autocracy is not strictly the opposite of democracy.  Hence, Polity IV is more 
constructive than FH and V-Dem, although both FH and V-Dem have more comprehensive 
definitions of democracy. 
 High variation of autocratic behaviors among democracies, regardless of the 
measurement, have some implementations in our studies, including this one.  Repression’s 
effect over protest conditioned on regime type fails to produce a significant relationship for 
closed and open anocracies.  It is conceivable that the reason could be the incomprehensive 
definition and measure used for political regimes.  Had we increased differentiation 
between/among regimes and overarched the concept of democracy/autocracy without going 
“down the ladder of generality” (Collier and Levitsky, 1997, 449), we would avoid conceptual 
stretching and results here might have presented a more robust analysis.  Adding further 
defining attributes and establishing cutoff points between democracies and non-democracies is 
useful to characterize and capture regimes in transition.   
 Nevertheless, note that multiple regression analysis assumes that the relationship 
between protest and repression’s conditional effect of regime type is linear.  Thus, when the 
effect of repression travels from negative to positive, the slope must pass by zero and cases 
with confidence intervals that contain zero are, of course, below the critical t-value.  Even if it 
is the author who statistically forces some cases of anocracies to be insignificant with a linear 
assumption, political scientists should revise our understanding and measurement of regimes, 
especially for democracy, and reach a consensus.  Only then we have none or at least, 
inconsiderable amounts of conflictive observations such as democratic states with repression 
or limited media and domestic movement freedoms.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The findings of this thesis support rational and value-expectancy models, suggesting 
that a country’s level of repression, regime type, media freedom, wealth and citizens’ ability 
to mobilize are determinants of the number of protests.  More specifically, repressive policies 
under autocracies increase the cost of protest and deter individuals from collective action.  
Inversely, repression incites protest should the regime is democracy or full democracy where 
costs are usually low.  Repression’s conditional effect adduces to support the rationalistic 
notion that high costs have a reductive effect on collective action.  When benefits exceed costs, 
citizens show less reluctance to protest.  In a nutshell, the frequency of protest events across 
nations from 1990 to 2004 is contingent on whether the combination of a state’s repression 
level and regime type increases (decreases) costs and decreases (increases) benefits, affecting 
the achievability of the public good.  Unlike autocracies, government concession is a viable 
option in democracies and perceived as an opportunity by the dissident.  Hence repression 
aggravates protests.   
 Placed within the rationalist context, the increment of wealth displays a positive and 
statistically significant effect on protest, which suggests two interpretations.  First, the poor do 
not get as deprived as the wealthy once threatened with the seizure of assets because 
economically advantaged individuals have more to risk and lose.  Absolute poverty is not 
necessarily iniquitous for the ones who experience it every day.  Second, wealth is a crucial 
factor to provide resources to mobilize individuals, start and sustain protests.  Political 
activities require actors an entry cost for participation and wealth enables them to afford the 
entry cost.  GDP/capita serves as an indicator of a country’s wealth without consideration of 
how that wealth is distributed.  Therefore, it may have some limitations on reflecting economic 
inequalities.  Howbeit, it gives us valuable insight into the relationship between wealth and 
protest. 
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 Mobilization also appears to play a prominent role in shaping protests.  Although media 
freedom has failed to the robustness test, constraints on freedom of the press and domestic 
movement have been demonstrated to be important motives behind the civil unrest.  This 
outcome also relates to the rational actor-based models.  Strict control of the media has several 
implications.  First, the media have the power to mislead citizens to think that the government 
is performing well.  Second, the media may justify government’s authoritarian behaviors.  
Third, the state may use media as a tool to repress by airing or publishing that ones who 
challenge the authority are reprimanded harshly and ones with a predilection for the 
government are rewarded.  Fourth, even if the disaffected manages to organize a protest, the 
news about the event can be stopped before it reaches the large masses without the media.  
People cannot attend a protest, of which they are not aware.  The first two implications preclude 
individuals from being refractory.  The latter two make them remain compliant.   
 Restrictions on domestic movement freedom lead to a similar inference.  Provided that 
the state does not allow its citizens to move within their country and punishes for disobedience, 
people will not be able to or prefer not to participate in protests.  Residents of City A will have 
difficulties to drive to City B for a protest because they face the consequences if they travel.  
City A is an open-air prison for its residents, forcing them to seek opportunities to protest inside 
their city.  Nevertheless, domestic movement subsume restrictions of intra-city movements as 
well.  Governments can effectively surveil its citizens who cannot travel.  Hence, the lack of 
free domestic movement damages the success of mobilization.   
 In addition to repression, limiting the freedom of media and the ability of domestic 
movement should not be regarded as a standard behavior of democratic states, and yet analysis 
here demonstrates a considerable number of democracies with such restrictions.  This thesis, 
strikingly, shows that even full democracies have authoritarian tendencies and policies.  
Therefore, the ultimate conclusion of this thesis is that our definition of regimes, especially 
democracy, cause some limitations on studies of domestic political conflict.  We can deduce 
that a universally accepted taxonomy of regime types is a necessity to develop vigorous 
theories.  Dichotomous and trichotomous scales of regimes lump countries with saliently 
different characteristics into same categories and omit transitional regimes.  Although extended 
categorization helps us achieve more valid and reliable analyses of protest, we are not likely to 
be satisfied with our results before we determine the components of regime types and improve 
their definitions.   
 One of the most important discoveries of this thesis is that democracies and full 
democracies also repress citizens, control the media and/or constrain domestic movement.  The 
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reason for this outcome is that scholars could not succeed in defining democracy and 
differentiating democratic nations.  When the definition of democracy is narrowed down to one 
component, the negligence of democracy’s other dimensions causes unexpected variations.  All 
respected measures of democracy focus on some components and ignore others.  For instance, 
Freedom House takes individuals’ rights and freedoms into account, pretermitting competitive, 
regulative and participative features of regimes.  On the other hand, Polity IV – the source of 
regime scores employed in this thesis –  essentially assesses nations’ governing performances.  
Although V-Dem’s both democracy indexes seem to offer a balanced definition, democracies 
still vary among each other in V-Dem.  Regardless of the measure, it is conspicuous that a 
conceptualization problem of regimes exists in general and it is not limited to Polity IV.  It is 
possible that insignificant results of repression’s marginal effect on protest for closed and open 
anocracies are due to this conceptual problem.  Therefore, further empirical tests should be 
conducted with a meticulous classification of regime types. 
 Another possible area of research on protest includes an in-depth investigation of the 
relationship between protest and media freedom.  Primary model evinces that the lack of media 
freedom conduces to fewer protests; however, it remains undetermined whether their causal 
relationship is robustly significant.  Furthermore, the freedom of alternative media sources is 
encouraged for further analyses.  Four implications of the conventional media’s freedom may 
not be applied to social media.  State control of the social media is more difficult than the 
control of printing and broadcasting.  Hence, the spread of protesting news and political 
discontent may become inexorable.   
 Moreover, freedom of domestic movement can be expanded with the physical ability 
of domestic and international movement.  The total length of rail lines, highways, number of 
privately owned vehicles and passengers carried with airlines may be causally related to 
protest.  Nonetheless, a substantial amount of work is needed to avoid high correlation and 
multicollinearity between the ability of movement and indicators of national wealth such as 
GDP/capita.  Finally, exogenous factors may uncover further explanations.  For example, a 
country’s level of political globalization can be applied to the model.  A nation’s bilateral and 
multilateral relations with other nations and supranational organizations may have an impact 
on domestic conflict.  Ideas and social movements can spread globally and exposure to a 
volatile international environment may foment protests.   
 In conclusion, this thesis demonstrates that repression, regime type, level of repression 
conditional on regime type, freedom of domestic movement, freedom of media and wealth are 
some of the core explanations that determine the number of protests nations experience.  It 
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suggests that rationalist approach is more epideictic than the theories of relative deprivation 
and the majority of the findings should be interpreted with a cost-benefit perspective.  This 
study also reveals an urgent need for a conceptual revision of regime types, upon which studies 
on civil unrest can be ameliorated.   
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